8 FSM Intrm. 560-564

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

CHUUK STATE TRIAL DIVISION

Cite as Mathew v. Silander,

8 FSM Intrm. 560 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998)

[8 FSM Intrm. 560]

TONY MATHEW,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SICHIRO SILANDER.

Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-98

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Soukichi Fritz

Chief Justice

Decided: February 23, 1998

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: Johnny Meippen, Esq.

P.O. Box 705

Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

For the Defendant: Ben K. Enlet, trial counselor

P.O. Box 123

Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

[8 FSM Intrm. 561]

* * * *

HEADNOTES

Elections

The right to contest an election is not a common-law right. Elections belong to the political branch of the government, and are beyond the control of the judicial power. An election contest is purely a constitutional or statutory proceeding. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 562 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998).

Elections

It is a general rule that courts of equity have no inherent power to try contested elections, notwithstanding fraud on the part of the election officers. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 562 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998).

Elections

The constitutions and statutes of most jurisdictions provide, as a part of the machinery of elections, a procedure by which election results may be contested. Such contests are regulated wholly by the constitutional or statutory provisions. They are not actions at law or suits in equity, and were unknown to the common law. The proceedings are special and summary in their nature. A strict observance to the steps necessary to give jurisdiction is required, and the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the proceedings. If these steps are not followed, courts are powerless to entertain such proceedings. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 563 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998).

Elections

The determination of an election contest is a judicial function only so far as authorized by the statute. The court exercising the jurisdiction does not proceed according to the course of the common law, but must resort to the statute alone to ascertain its powers and mode of procedure. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 563 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998).

Administrative Law ) Judicial Review

The Chuuk State Supreme Court trial division has jurisdiction to review the actions ofany state administrative agency, board, or commission, as may be provided by law. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 563-64 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998).

Elections

The Chuuk Constitution provides that there shall be an independent election commission vested with powers, duties, and responsibilities, as prescribed by statute, for the administration of elections in Chuuk. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 564 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998).

Elections

The Chuuk State Supreme Court trial division could have had jurisdiction over election commission appeals had the legislature seen fit to grant it such authority, but the Election Law of 1996, provides that Chuuk Election Commission decisions may be appealed to the appellate division. Therefore an election contest appeal in the trial division will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 564 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998).

[8 FSM Intrm. 562]

* * * *

COURT'S OPINION

SOUKICHI FRITZ, Chief Justice:

This case comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the above entitled matter on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the action and grant the relief for which Plaintiff seeks.

This is an attempt to contest the results of the municipal election held on November 11, 1997 for election of the mayor and councilmen for the Municipality of Piisemwar. The Plaintiff, Mathew was the incumbent Mayor and candidate for re-election. The Defendant Silander was the only challenger for the office of Mayor. The matter now before the Court relates only to the election for the office of Mayor.

The complaint in this case was filed in the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court on January 14, 1998, alleging that the Plaintiff was the successful candidate for mayor in the election held on November 1, 1997. The Plaintiff asks for injunctive relief to prevent the Defendant from conducting an inauguration ceremony, from taking the oath of office and from interfering with the incumbent plaintiff in his performance of the duties of mayor.

The primary issue and the only issue for the proper disposition of this case is whether the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider contested elections.

The rule at common law is stated in 29 C.J.S. Elections § 246 (1965) (footnote omitted) as follows: "The right to contest an election is not a common-law right. Elections belong to the political branch of the government, and are beyond the control of the judicial power."

26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 316 (1966) repeats the rule as follows: "An election contest is purely a constitutional or statutory proceeding. At common law there was no right to contest in a court any public election, the theory being that elections belong to the political branch of the government, beyond the control of judicial power . . . ."

As to courts of equity, it is said:

The jurisdiction of courts exercising general equity powers does not include election contests, unless it is so provided expressly or impliedly by the constitution or by statute. The reason for this exclusion is that the questions involved are political, and the right to public office is not considered as constituting property in such a sense as will warrant the intervention of equity to protect it . . . nor will an injunction issue to restrain one of two claimants to an office . . . in controversy from exercising the duties of the office because of any defect in his election.

Id. § 317 (footnotes omitted).

29 C.J.S. Elections § 248 (1965) provides that: "It is a general rule that courts of equity have no inherent power to try contested elections, notwithstanding fraud on the part of the election officers . . . ."

The foregoing authorities have been quoted at length so that there be no doubt that this court

[8 FSM Intrm. 563]

has no jurisdiction to hear an election contest unless the contestant can point to a specific constitutional or statutory provision that gives the court jurisdiction.

Again, the court feels compelled to discuss the need for constitutional or statutory provisions giving the court jurisdiction in election contests by quoting at length from the authorities on this subject:

26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 318 (1966).

On the question of the court's jurisdiction to hear election contest cases, further authority is found in 29 C.J.S. Elections § 252 (1965) (footnotes omitted) which states that:

election contests are purely statutory, and the courts have no inherent power to determine election contests, the determination of such contests being a judicial function only when and to the extent that the determination is authorized by statute. Constitutional or statutory provisions in the various jurisdictions determine what court shall entertain the proceedings, and only the court or board authorized by the statute has jurisdiction to hear an election contest, and then only to the extent authorized.

From a procedural standpoint, the case at bar is near identical to Tazwell v. Davis, 130 P. 400 (Or. 1913) and the Tazwell case is cited in support of all the legal quotations previously cited in the case at bar.

In the Tazwell case, the election contestant filed a special proceeding in the trial court. The trial court dismissed the case for the reason that the court had no jurisdiction to try the proceedings. The Supreme Court of Oregon said:

In the absence of any statutory proceedings, the only remedy in the nature of a contest known to the common law is quo warranto, or in modern times, an action in the nature of quo warranto. The determination of an election contest is a judicial function only so far as authorized by the statute. The court exercising the jurisdiction does not proceed according to the course of the common law, but must resort to the statute alone to ascertain its powers and mode of procedure.

Id. at 401.

Thus, it is clear that if this court has jurisdiction to decide an election contest, there must be a specific constitutional or statutory provision giving the Trial Division that authority. Looking first to the Chuuk State Constitution, there are but two sections relative to the issues in his case.

Article VII, Section 3(c) states: "The trial division of the State Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the actions of any state administrative agency, board, or commission, as may be provided

[8 FSM Intrm. 564]

by law."

Article XII, Section 4, provides as follows: "There shall be an independent Election Commission vested with powers, duties, and responsibilities, as prescribed by statute, for the administration of elections in the State of Chuuk, including voter registration and the conduct and certification of elections."

Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the legislature has enacted the Election Law of 1996 for the governance of elections including judicial review. The Election Law of 1996, Section 3(a), states: "There shall be within the government of Chuuk State the independent Election Commission."

Further definition is given for the composition, duties, and responsibilities of the Commission. Clearly, this is a "commission" over which the Trial Division could have had jurisdiction pursuant to Article VII, Section 3(c), had the legislature seen fit to grant such authority to the Trial Division.

The legislative intent is specifically spelled out to the contrary. Section 130, Election Law of 1996, provides: "A decision of the Chuuk Election Commission may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court."

There is no other reference to an appeal in the Election Law of 1996, and no where does this Law state that the Trial Division has any jurisdiction whatsoever in the matter of elections.

Section 148, Election Law of 1996, states as follows: "All the provisions of this Act shall apply to all elections in the State of Chuuk, including municipal or national election whenever applicable unless otherwise specifically provided."

This court finds no law which specifically provides that this case is to be governed by rules other than those cited herein.

The provisions of the Election Law of 1996 set out specific remedies and procedures for the contestant in any election case to follow. Under the great weight of authority and the prevailing rule of law and the specific provisions of the constitution and statutes of Chuuk State, the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in this case and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss this case is due to be granted.

It is so ordered.

* * * *


	THE SUPREME COURT OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA CHUUK STATE TRIAL DIVISION Cite as Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998) [8 FSM Intrm. 560] TONY MATHEW, Plaintiff, vs. SICHIRO SILANDER. Defendant. CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-98 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS Soukichi Fritz Chief Justice Decided: February 23, 1998 APPEARANCES: For the Plaintiff: Johnny Meippen, Esq. P.O. Box 705 Weno, Chuuk FM 96942 For the Defendant: Ben K. Enlet, trial counselor P.O. Box 123 Weno, Chuuk FM 96942 [8 FSM Intrm. 561] * * * * HEADNOTES Elections The right to contest an election is not a common-law right. Elections belong to the political branch of the government, and are beyond the control of the judicial power. An election contest is purely a constitutional or statutory proceeding. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 562 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998). Elections The jurisdiction of courts exercising general equity powers does not include election contests, unless it is so provided expressly or impliedly by the constitution or by statute. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 562 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998). Elections It is a general rule that courts of equity have no inherent power to try contested elections, notwithstanding fraud on the part of the election officers. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 562 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998). Elections The constitutions and statutes of most jurisdictions provide, as a part of the machinery of elections, a procedure by which election results may be contested. Such contests are regulated wholly by the constitutional or statutory provisions. They are not actions at law or suits in equity, and were unknown to the common law. The proceedings are special and summary in their nature. A strict observance to the steps necessary to give jurisdiction is required, and the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the proceedings. If these steps are not followed, courts are powerless to entertain such proceedings. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 563 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998). Elections The determination of an election contest is a judicial function only so far as authorized by the statute. The court exercising the jurisdiction does not proceed according to the course of the common law, but must resort to the statute alone to ascertain its powers and mode of procedure. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 563 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998). Administrative Law ) Judicial Review The Chuuk State Supreme Court trial division has jurisdiction to review the actions ofany state administrative agency, board, or commission, as may be provided by law. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 563-64 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998). Elections The Chuuk Constitution provides that there shall be an independent election commission vested with powers, duties, and responsibilities, as prescribed by statute, for the administration of elections in Chuuk. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 564 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998). Elections The Chuuk State Supreme Court trial division could have had jurisdiction over election commission appeals had the legislature seen fit to grant it such authority, but the Election Law of 1996, provides that Chuuk Election Commission decisions may be appealed to the appellate division. Therefore an election contest appeal in the trial division will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Mathew v. Silander, 8 FSM Intrm. 560, 564 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1998). [8 FSM Intrm. 562] * * * * COURT'S OPINION SOUKICHI FRITZ, Chief Justice: This case comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the above entitled matter on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the action and grant the relief for which Plaintiff seeks. This is an attempt to contest the results of the municipal election held on November 11, 1997 for election of the mayor and councilmen for the Municipality of Piisemwar. The Plaintiff, Mathew was the incumbent Mayor and candidate for re-election. The Defendant Silander was the only challenger for the office of Mayor. The matter now before the Court relates only to the election for the office of Mayor. The complaint in this case was filed in the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court on January 14, 1998, alleging that the Plaintiff was the successful candidate for mayor in the election held on November 1, 1997. The Plaintiff asks for injunctive relief to prevent the Defendant from conducting an inauguration ceremony, from taking the oath of office and from interfering with the incumbent plaintiff in his performance of the duties of mayor. The primary issue and the only issue for the proper disposition of this case is whether the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider contested elections. The rule at common law is stated in 29 C.J.S. Elections § 246 (1965) (footnote omitted) as follows: "The right to contest an election is not a common-law right. Elections belong to the political branch of the government, and are beyond the control of the judicial power." 26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 316 (1966) repeats the rule as follows: "An election contest is purely a constitutional or statutory proceeding. At common law there was no right to contest in a court any public election, the theory being that elections belong to the political branch of the government, beyond the control of judicial power . . . ." As to courts of equity, it is said: The jurisdiction of courts exercising general equity powers does not include election contests, unless it is so provided expressly or impliedly by the constitution or by statute. The reason for this exclusion is that the questions involved are political, and the right to public office is not considered as constituting property in such a sense as will warrant the intervention of equity to protect it . . . nor will an injunction issue to restrain one of two claimants to an office . . . in controversy from exercising the duties of the office because of any defect in his election. Id. § 317 (footnotes omitted). 29 C.J.S. Elections § 248 (1965) provides that: "It is a general rule that courts of equity have no inherent power to try contested elections, notwithstanding fraud on the part of the election officers . . . ." The foregoing authorities have been quoted at length so that there be no doubt that this court [8 FSM Intrm. 563] has no jurisdiction to hear an election contest unless the contestant can point to a specific constitutional or statutory provision that gives the court jurisdiction. Again, the court feels compelled to discuss the need for constitutional or statutory provisions giving the court jurisdiction in election contests by quoting at length from the authorities on this subject: The constitutions and statutes of most jurisdictions provide, as a part of the machinery of elections, a procedure by which election results may be contested. Such contests are regulated wholly by the constitutional or statutory provisions. They are not actions at law or suits in equity, and were unknown to the common law. The proceedings are special and summary in their nature. A strict observance to the steps necessary to give jurisdiction is required, and the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the proceedings. If these steps are not followed, courts are powerless to entertain such proceedings. 26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 318 (1966). On the question of the court's jurisdiction to hear election contest cases, further authority is found in 29 C.J.S. Elections § 252 (1965) (footnotes omitted) which states that: election contests are purely statutory, and the courts have no inherent power to determine election contests, the determination of such contests being a judicial function only when and to the extent that the determination is authorized by statute. Constitutional or statutory provisions in the various jurisdictions determine what court shall entertain the proceedings, and only the court or board authorized by the statute has jurisdiction to hear an election contest, and then only to the extent authorized. From a procedural standpoint, the case at bar is near identical to Tazwell v. Davis, 130 P. 400 (Or. 1913) and the Tazwell case is cited in support of all the legal quotations previously cited in the case at bar. In the Tazwell case, the election contestant filed a special proceeding in the trial court. The trial court dismissed the case for the reason that the court had no jurisdiction to try the proceedings. The Supreme Court of Oregon said: In the absence of any statutory proceedings, the only remedy in the nature of a contest known to the common law is quo warranto, or in modern times, an action in the nature of quo warranto. The determination of an election contest is a judicial function only so far as authorized by the statute. The court exercising the jurisdiction does not proceed according to the course of the common law, but must resort to the statute alone to ascertain its powers and mode of procedure. Id. at 401. Thus, it is clear that if this court has jurisdiction to decide an election contest, there must be a specific constitutional or statutory provision giving the Trial Division that authority. Looking first to the Chuuk State Constitution, there are but two sections relative to the issues in his case. Article VII, Section 3(c) states: "The trial division of the State Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the actions of any state administrative agency, board, or commission, as may be provided [8 FSM Intrm. 564] by law." Article XII, Section 4, provides as follows: "There shall be an independent Election Commission vested with powers, duties, and responsibilities, as prescribed by statute, for the administration of elections in the State of Chuuk, including voter registration and the conduct and certification of elections." Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the legislature has enacted the Election Law of 1996 for the governance of elections including judicial review. The Election Law of 1996, Section 3(a), states: "There shall be within the government of Chuuk State the independent Election Commission." Further definition is given for the composition, duties, and responsibilities of the Commission. Clearly, this is a "commission" over which the Trial Division could have had jurisdiction pursuant to Article VII, Section 3(c), had the legislature seen fit to grant such authority to the Trial Division. The legislative intent is specifically spelled out to the contrary. Section 130, Election Law of 1996, provides: "A decision of the Chuuk Election Commission may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court." There is no other reference to an appeal in the Election Law of 1996, and no where does this Law state that the Trial Division has any jurisdiction whatsoever in the matter of elections. Section 148, Election Law of 1996, states as follows: "All the provisions of this Act shall apply to all elections in the State of Chuuk, including municipal or national election whenever applicable unless otherwise specifically provided." This court finds no law which specifically provides that this case is to be governed by rules other than those cited herein. The provisions of the Election Law of 1996 set out specific remedies and procedures for the contestant in any election case to follow. Under the great weight of authority and the prevailing rule of law and the specific provisions of the constitution and statutes of Chuuk State, the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in this case and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss this case is due to be granted. It is so ordered. * * * *