State of Yap v. Langmed Rul. 1

THE STATE COURT OF YAP

IN THETRIAL DIVISION

Cite as State of Yap v. Langmed, (Yap St. 1994)

[page 1]

THE STATE OF YAP

Plaintiff,

vs.

LEO LANGMED,

Defendant

Cr. Case No. 1994-270

RULING ON MOTION TO

SUPPRESS

The defendant moved the Court to suppress statements he made to the police when arrested on August 24, 1994. Defendant contends that all of his rights as enumerated by 12 FSMC 218 were not given and the statements are thus violative of the due process requirements of the FSM and Yap State Constitutions. Based on the recent decision in Yap State v. Alexander Maw, Yap Cr. Case No. 1994-116, however, the motion must be denied.

The State contends that the reason, based on Maw, that the motion must fail is because of the language in Maw that states: "The State of Yap has adequately been advising suspects of their rights under the constitution of both the State of Yap and the FSM". While Maw does use this language, the statement is not complete for Maw also requires an additional element to be applied in future cases.

In the November 7, 1994 decision at page 2, lines 12 through 17, Maw requires the right to counsel element be carefully explained to the suspect in order that waiver be knowing and voluntary. Due to the differences in the Micronesian and United States cultures, not everyone in Yap has grown up with Miranda and its purpose. In order that a similar provision is applied fairly, it is required that the suspect is specifically told not only that counsel will be provided if requested, but further that "If you request counsel all questioning

[page 2]

must cease until counsel is present." It is important that suspects fully understand the implications of asserting or waiving their rights for any confession to be voluntarily given.

Thus, since questioning here was over two months before the Maw decision, the fifth requirement contained in Maw does not apply and the State is accurate in their quote of Maw as to this defendant. However, the Maw decision will be seen as requiring the fifth element for clarity in the future. Seeing that Maw is adhered to is, of course, the duty of the government, and fairness to all would have that a certain time limit lapse between the decision and its enforcement. Thus, as of December 19, 1994, this Court will strictly follow Maw in adopting the fifth element.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT IS HEREBY DENIED.

Dated: Dec.8, 1994 /s/

Judge C. Yinug

Filed: 12/08/94 /s/

Clerk of Court


	THE STATE COURT OF YAP IN THETRIAL DIVISION *Cite as State of Yap v. Langmed, (Yap St. 1994)* [page 1] THE STATE OF YAP Plaintiff, vs. LEO LANGMED, Defendant Cr. Case No. 1994-270 RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS The defendant moved the Court to suppress statements he made to the police when arrested on August 24, 1994. Defendant contends that all of his rights as enumerated by 12 FSMC 218 were not given and the statements are thus violative of the due process requirements of the FSM and Yap State Constitutions. Based on the recent decision in Yap State v. Alexander Maw, Yap Cr. Case No. 1994-116, however, the motion must be denied. The State contends that the reason, based on Maw, that the motion must fail is because of the language in Maw that states: "The State of Yap has adequately been advising suspects of their rights under the constitution of both the State of Yap and the FSM". While Maw does use this language, the statement is not complete for Maw also requires an additional element to be applied in future cases. In the November 7, 1994 decision at page 2, lines 12 through 17, Maw requires the right to counsel element be carefully explained to the suspect in order that waiver be knowing and voluntary. Due to the differences in the Micronesian and United States cultures, not everyone in Yap has grown up with Miranda and its purpose. In order that a similar provision is applied fairly, it is required that the suspect is specifically told not only that counsel will be provided if requested, but further that "If you request counsel all questioning [page 2] must cease until counsel is present." It is important that suspects fully understand the implications of asserting or waiving their rights for any confession to be voluntarily given. Thus, since questioning here was over two months before the Maw decision, the fifth requirement contained in Maw does not apply and the State is accurate in their quote of Maw as to this defendant. However, the Maw decision will be seen as requiring the fifth element for clarity in the future. Seeing that Maw is adhered to is, of course, the duty of the government, and fairness to all would have that a certain time limit lapse between the decision and its enforcement. Thus, as of December 19, 1994, this Court will strictly follow Maw in adopting the fifth element. MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT IS HEREBY DENIED. Dated: Dec.8, 1994 /s/ Judge C. Yinug Filed: 12/08/94 /s/ Clerk of Court