POHNPEI LAW REPORTS
VOL. 3
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281]
PERDUS EHSA,
Plaintiff
v.
MAX LADORE and RETLEY OLTER,
Defendants
Pohnpei Civil Action No. 215-85
Trial Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court
January 4, 19$9
Action for the recovery of damages in connection with a car rental
agreement. Before the hearing for the assessment of damages, the Court had
by error ordered that judgment by default be entered against the
defendants. The Trial Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court, JUDAH C.
JOHNNY, Associate Justice, held (1) that the intent of the order was not
to grant a "judgment by default" but rather to enter an "order for
default" against the defendants; (2) that as bailees the defendants were
liable to the plaintiff for the rental fee agreed, the cost of repairs in
respect of damage caused to the vehicle and punitive damages for
Intentional malicious wrongdoing in conscious disregard of the rights of
the plaintiff.
1. Judgments - Error - Correction by Court
The court may on its own motion correct an error in an order made by it.
2. Judgments - Default Judgments
A default is a judicial admission of the plaintiff's right to recover, and a default judgment is the judicial pronouncement which puts an end to controversy and makes available to the prevailing party, the coercive process of the court, and is as efficacious as any other judgment.
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282]
3. Judgments - Default Judgments
A judgment by default is to be distinguished from the mere entry of default; the entry of a default does not constitute a judgment, but rather an order precluding the defaulting party from making any further defense in the case as far as his liability is concerned.
4. Damages - Definition
"Damages" is the sum of money which the law awards or imposes as pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for any injury done or a wrong sustained as a consequence either of a breach of a contractual obligation or tortious act; or technically consists of a pecuniary compensation or indemnity which may be recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury, whether to his person, property or rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of another.
5. Damages - Custom
The philosophy of damages is not uncommon to the people of Pohnpei, for they have a system of customary reconciliation; thus the customary practice of restitution, compensation or reparation for injury or loss incurred from contractual breaches ortortious acts has been prevalent among the people for ages.
6. Damages - Statutes - Courts - Powers
While no statutes exist in Pohnpei governing allowances of damages in the courts, the law of logic suffices to enable the Court to invoke jurisdiction on matters affecting the granting or denying of damages in Pohnpei State.
7. Bailment - Conversion
Generally speaking, conversion of property by the bailee may be committed in two ways: (1) by acts in derogation of the bailor's title, and (2) by acts in derogation of the bailor's possessory rights.
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283]
8. Contracts - Bailment - Conversion
Conversion of property by a bailee may be committed by using or dealing with the property in a way unauthorized by the terms of bailment, and in defiance or derogation of the bailor's title, by attempted sale, pledge, gift or other transfer of the property . . . or by failing or refusing to redeliver the property to the bailor in accordance with the terms of the contract.
9. Bailment - Conversion
An absolute unqualified refusal by a bailee, in defiance or in derogation of a bailor's title to possession, to return or redeliverthe bailor's property to the bailor, unaccompanied by any explanation justifying it on some valid legal ground, though some undisclosed legal excuse actually exists at the time, or a refusal purportedly based on reasons that in fact are false and deceptive, constitutes an actionable conversion.
10. Bailment - Bailee - Restitution
A person who has tortiously obtained, retained, used or disposed of the chattels of another, is under duty of restitution to the other.
11. Bailment - Bailee - Restitution - Period of Accountability
The time during which the recipient of a chattel under bailment is accountable for the use of the subject matter begins when he first receives it and terminates when he surrenders or otherwise disposes of it or, if he still has it, at the time for the verdict or judgment.
12. Bailment - Bailee - Unjust enrichment - Restitution
A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.
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284]
13. Bailment - Ballee - Unjust Enrichment
A person is enriched if he has received benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if the retention of the benefit would be unjust.
14. Bailment - Baflee - Benefit
A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other, possession of some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in action, performs services beneficial to, or at the request of the other, satisfies a debt or duty of another, or in any way adds to the other's security or advantage. The benefit is unjust if the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for him to retain it.
15. Bailment - Bailee - Duty of Care
Law imposes on a bailee certain obligations with respect to care of the bailed property while in his possession. An utter absence of all duty of care even on the part of a gratuitous bailee is, in the eyes of the law, an impossible situation, inconsistent with the very nature of the bailment relation, which implies confidence and trust necessarily involving the exercise of some degree of care.
16. Damages - Elements of Damages - Evidence - Proof of Damages Automobiles
While the cost of repair is an element of damages in an action to recover for injury to a motor vehicle, mere testimony as to the amount paid for repairs is not sufficient upon which to base recovery, but rather the plaintiff must show the necessity for the repairs and their reasonable value. In fact, it is not ordinarily considered a condition precedent to the recovery of damages on the basis of the cost of repairs that the plaintiff should have actually paid for the repairs made, or have incurred liability for making the repairs.
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285]
17. Damages - Measure of Damages - Automobiles
Insofar as the proper measure of damages is the cost of making repairs, the owner of a motor vehicle which has been damaged by another in an accident is not bound to expend such amount or to put the vehicle in substantially the same condition as it was before the accident prior to commencing an action.
18. Damages - Measure of Damages - Automobiles
Where a motor vehicle damaged by another in an accident has not been repaired by the owner, recovery cannot be had on the basis of reasonable repairs.
19. Damages - Measure of Damages - Automobiles
As a general rule, where a motor vehicle is damaged by another in an accident, damages recoverable are measured by the difference in value of the vehicle before and after the accident.
20. Contracts - Automobiles - Rental Agreements - Damages Measure of Damages
In order to assess damages recoverable under a motor vehicle rental agreement, the Court will look to such agreement, by which the defendants took possession and use of the vehicle from the plaintiff.
21. Damages - Punitive Damages
Punitive damages which are synonymous to "exemplary" or "vindictive" damages, also sometimes called "smart money", are allowed and awarded as a punishment to the defendant and as a warning and example to deter him and others from committing like offenses in the future. Such damages are allowed on grounds of public policy and in the interest of society and for public benefit,
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not as compensatory damages, but rather in addition to such damages.
22. Damages - Punitive Damages - Measure of Damages
In assessing exemplary or punitive damages, the nature, extent, and enormity of the wrong, the intent of the party committing it, and, generally, all the circumstances attending to the particular transaction involved, including any mitigating circumstances which may operate to reduce without wholly defeating such damages, may be taken into consideration, and so, as a rule, may the financial and social condition and standing of the party.
23. Damages - Punitive Damages - Measure of Damages
Punitive damages are incapable of definite ascertainment and from their nature cannot be governed or measured by any precise rules. But the general doctrine is that punitive damages awarded must bear some reasonable relation to the injury inflicted and the cause thereof.
24. Damages - Punitive Damages - Measure of Damages
Punitive damages may not be awarded in a case where the amount of compensatory damages is adequate to punish the defendant. In a case where compensatory damages are not adequate for the purpose of punishment, only such an additional amount should be awarded as, taken together with the compensatory damages, will be sufficient for that purpose.
25. Damages - Punitive Damages - Measure of Damages - Courts Powers
The amount to be awarded in respect of punitive damages rests in the sound and unlimited discretion of the Court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, but the Court is not at liberty to award by way of punitive damages any amount, regardless of how much it may be. Such amount shall be reasonable
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and adequate to punish the defendant while at the same time add to the reparation to the plaintiff beyond the compensatory damages awarded.
Counsel for Plaintiff: R. Barrie Michelson
Law Offices of Stovall
Spradlin, Ramp, Armstrong and Israel
P. O. Box 1480
Kolonia, Pohnpei , 96941
Counsel for Defendants: Pro se
JUDAH C. JOHNNY, Associate Justice
[1] It is appropriate in the interest of clarity, that this Court correctthe inadvertent error made in the entry of default againstthe defendants on June 12,1986. The record will show that the Court required certain actions to be performed by the parties to this action in preparation for pre-trial conference, and subsequently set the matter for pre-trial conference. The defendants failed to comply with those requirements without showing of good cause. They further failed to appear or be represented at the pre-trial conference. Consequently, on June 12,1986, an order of this Court was entered, holding the defendants in default. That order may be misleading because of the way it is worded. It is entitled "Default Judgment", and inadvertently stated on page 2, lines 18 and 19, "It
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is therefore ordered that judgment by default is entered against the defendants." This Court erred in applying the terms because the intent ofthe orderwas notto grant a "judgment by default" but rather to enter an "order for default" against the defendants.
[2-3] A default is a judicial admission of the plaintiff's right to recover, and a default judgment is the judicial pronouncement which puts an end to controversy and makes available to the prevailing party, the coercive process of the court.
"A judgment by default is to be distinguished from the mere entry of default; the entry of a default does not constitute a judgment, but rather "an order precluding the defaulting party from making any further defense in the case as far as his liability is concerned." 47 Am Jur 2d, Judgments, Section 1153.
This was the intent of the June 12, 1986 order - it was issued to preclude the defendants from making any defense with respect to their liability to the plaintiff for having defaulted. The question of damage was not intended to be resolved, since the Court felt it necessary to determine the actual damage to the plaintiff by production of evidence, pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure 50(2).
"A default judgment is the judicial pronouncement which puts an end to controversy, makes available to the prevailing party the coercive process of the court, and is as efficacious as any other judgment." Chamacho v. Gardner 435 P2d 719.
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The coercive process of the court is the rendition of judgment on damages or default judgment. The records as have been inadvertently made are therefore hereby accordingly corrected.
BACKGROUND
The defendants having thus been prevented from defense of liability, damages are based on the facts discussed hereafter.
On April 30,1985, defendant Max Ladore rented a SABARU 2-door motor vehicle from the plaintiff, at an agreed rental rate of $20 per day, for two days. The defendant failed to return to the plaintiff the rented vehicle and failed to pay the agreed rental amount.
On June 7, 1985, 38 days thereafter, the said defendant and his wife Retley Olter, offered to purchase the vehicle. The plaintiff accepted the offerwhereupon they verbally agreed on a sale price of $2,500.00. The defendants then made a down payment of $1,000.00. On that date, it was understood that the defendants owed the total of $3,260.00, comprising a total rental cost of $760.00 ($20 x 38days) and the vehicle price of $2,500.00. The deposit of $1,000.00 was applied to the amount owing reducing it to $2,260.00. The defendants therefore continued possession of
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the vehicle.
On July 11, 1985, the parties executed a payment agreement, wherein it was agreed that the defendants would pay the purchase price of the vehicle at $100.00 per month, commencing on August 15,1985. The defendants failed to meet their payment obligations, and in fact made no payments as agreed. After futile attempts to enforce the terms of the agreement on the defendants, the plaintiff resorted to judicial action and repossessed the vehicle by replevin. He incurred an expense of $400.00 in counsel fee.
The defendants caused damage to the vehicle which required repairs at two repair shops, at a total repair cost of $310.00.
The plaintiff resold the vehicle for $500 to another purchaser.
To be made whole, the plaintiff claims that he is entitled to the proceeds he would have received under the sale contract, plus monetary damages, less the resale value of the car.
In summary, the plaintiff contends that on the day of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendants, he was entitled to $3,260.00, comprising the car rental cost of $760.00 and the sale price of the vehicle. The defendants paid $1,000.00, reducing the amount owed to $2,260.00. He was additionally damaged for
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paying the repair bills totalling $310.00, and attorney's fees of $400.00, therefore raising the total due to $2,970.00. He resold the vehicle for $500.00 which amount he will deduct from the total owing, reducing the amount due to $2,470.00. In addition to these, the plaintiff seeks punitive damages against the defendants initially for $5,000.00 but subsequently on oral argument, reduced it to $1,000.00. Therefore net damages sought by the plaintiff in this action is $3,470.00.
OPINION
I heard evidence on damages on August 11, 1986. The plaintiff appeared with counsel. The defendant, Max Ladore, appeared for the defendants in pro se.
[4] In legal contemplation, the term "damages" is the sum of money which the law awards or imposes as pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for any injury done or a wrong sustained as a consequence either of a breach of a contractual obligation or a tortious act. Wilson v. Donovan, 218 F Supp 944. It has been said that the word "damages" has an accepted technical meaning in law, consisting of a pecuniary compensation or indemnity which may be recovered in the courts by any person who has
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suffered loss, detriment, or injury; whether to his person, property, or rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of another. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Hanna, 224 F2d 499; 53 ALR 2d. 1125.
[5-6] The philosophy of damages is not uncommon to the people of Pohnpei, for they have a system of customary reconciliation. The customary practice of restitution, compensation, or reparation for injury or loss incurred from contractual breaches or tortious acts has been prevalent among the people for ages. Therefore, while no statutes exist in Pohnpei governing allowances of damages in the courts, the law of logic suffices to enable this Court to invoke jurisdiction on matters affecting the granting or denying of damages in this State.
Following, I will discuss my views in respect of the reliefs for damages that the plaintiff now seeks:
First as to the car rental fee - $760.00. The plaintiff brought evidence showing that the parties agreed that the defendant would rent the vehicle fortwo days, at $20.00 per day. The evidence also establishes that the defendants did not return the car at the end of the agreed rental period, and did not pay the agreed rental fee.
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[7-8] This action points similarly to another matter previously decided by this Court. See Yamada v. Carius, 2 P.S.Ct.R 57. In that case the defendant Carius agreed to rent an automobile from the plaintiff, Yamada, for two days, at an agreed rental fee of $28.00 per day. Upon expiration of the term of the lease, even though he returned the vehicle, the defendant did not pay the rental fee. The plaintiff refused to accept the automobile without payment of the rent. The defendant then kept possession of the vehicle for additional 116 days. The defendant contended thereafter that he was liable only for $56.00, comprising the two-day rent. This Court held the defendant liable in conversion, for the use of the vehicle for all the days in excess of the two-day rent and stated,
"Generally speaking conversion of property by the bailee may be committed in two ways:
(1) by acts in derogation of the bailor's title, and
(2) by acts in derogation of the bailor's possessory rights."
Citing Christiansen v. Pugh, 36 P2d 100, 95 A.L.R. 608 Conversion of a property by a bailee may be committed by using or dealing with the property in a way unauthorized by the terms of
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bailment, and in defiance or derogation of the bailor's title, by attempted sale, pledge, gift, or other transfer of the property, . . . or by failing or refusing to redeliver the property to the bailor in accordance with the terms of the contract. 8 Am Jur. 2d. Bailment, Section 118.
[9] In the case at bar, the parties agreed to the two-day rent. Their agreement placed their relationship in bailment. An absolute unqualified refusal by the bailee, in defiance or in derogation of the bailor's title to possession, to return or redeliver the property to the bailor, unaccompanied by any explanation justifying it on some valid legal ground, though some undisclosed legal excuse actually exists at the time, or a refusal purportedly based on reasons that in fact are false and deceptive, constitutes an actionable conversion. See Yamada, supra.
[10] Bailees here kept the property for a total of 38 days. Two days out of the 38 days was in accord with the bailment or the rental agreement, and will be governed by the contract. There is no question therefore that the defendants are liable to the plaintiff forthe rental fee as agreed. With respect to the other 36 days that
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the defendants kept possession of the vehicle, it was shown that they not only kept possession of it, but they in fact, continued to use it. A person who has tortiously obtained, retained, used, or disposed of the chattels of another, is underduty of restitution to the other. Restatement of Law, Restitution, Section 128. Also Yamada, supra.
[11-14] The time during which the recipient is accountable for the use of the subject matter begins when he first received it and terminates when he surrendered or otherwise disposed of it, or if he still has it, at the time for the verdict or judgment. Restatement of Law, Restitution, Section 157 c. It is shown that the defendants continued to use the vehicle for their sole benefit. They cannot therefore come to the court and seek to avoid liability after having committed the use of the chattel for their own benefit, for that is even a breach of the principle against unjust enrichment. A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other. A person is enriched if he has received benefit. He is unjustly enriched if the retention of the benefit would be unjust. A person confers a benefit upon another
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if he gives to the other, possession of some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in action, performs services beneficial to. or at the request of the other, satisfies a debt or duty of another, or in any way adds to the other's security or advantage. The benefit is unjust if the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for him to retain it. This is what happens between the parties in this case, and I fail to see justification for the defendants to keep possession of the vehicle beyond the term of the rental agreement. Having done so, they are liable to the plaintiff. I view that the benefit that they received for themselves from the plaintiff through the retention and use of the rental vehicle, beyond the agreed rental period, will fairly be equal to the rental value of the chattel. Thus, while the defendants are not liable to the plaintiff for possession of the vehicle under the rental agreement during the additional 36 days, they are liable for the use of it, at $20.00 each day.
Second, as to cost of repairs for damages inflicted on the vehicle - $310.00
[15] There is no evidence in this matter that counteracts the
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contention of the plaintiff that the repairs of the damage to the car, first at Abello Shop and later at Porakied Car Repair (PCR) was necessary. They were necessary to restore the vehicle to its status immediately prior to damage. Law imposes on a bailee certain obligations with respect to care of the bailed property while in his possession. An utter absence of all duty of care even on the part of a gratuitous bailee is, in the eyes of the law, an impossible situation, inconsistent with the very nature of the bailment relation, which implies confidence and trust necessarily involving the exercise of some degree of care. The bailees in this case are no exception.
Two invoices are admitted in evidence which show a total of $310.00 to repair the vehicle. The plaintiff has paid this cost of repair and here seeks reimbursement.
[16-19] While cost of repair is frequently an element of damages in an action to recover for injury to a motor vehicle, mere testimony as to the amount paid forthe repairs is not sufficient upon which to base recovery, but rather the plaintiff must show the necessity for the repairs and their reasonable value. For instance,
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recovery for the cost of anew fender for a three-year old car would be refused where the old fender could have been repaired. In fact, it is not ordinarily considered a condition precedent to the recovery of damages on the basis of the cost of repairs that the plaintiff should have actually paid for the repairs made, or have incurred liability for making repairs. Insofar as the proper measure of damages is the cost of making repairs, the owner is not bound to expend such amount or to put the vehicle in substantially the same condition as it was before the accident prior to commencing an action. However, where the damaged motor vehicle has not been repaired, recovery cannot be had on the basis of reasonable repairs. The general rule should be applied and damages measured by the difference in value of the vehicle before and after the accident. In this case, the plaintiff alleges by the complaint that the cost of repairs is $310.00. Evidence is convincing that the repairs are necessary, and the cost reasonable. It is allowed against the defendants.
Third, as to the purchase price of the motor vehicle: $2,500.00. The evidence establishes the fact that after the
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defendants defaulted in their monthly installment payments, the plaintiff repossessed the vehicle by replevin. The plaintiff then resold the vehicle to another person for $500.00.
The plaintiff seeks to collect the unpaid balance of the $2,500.00 from the defendants. He argues that when the defendants offered to purchase the motor vehicle, they deposited $1,000.00, which amount was applied to pay the rental fee of $760.00, with the remainder to the purchase price of the vehicle. The plaintiff contends that he had additionally mitigated the purchase price by selling the vehicle for $500.00. In essence, whatthe plaintiff contends having received in partial payment of the motor vehicle is $240.00.
I cannot agree to grant the relief that the plaintiff seeks under the circumstances of this case.
While possession of the motor vehicle was transferred to the defendants, it is obvious that title did not pass to them up to the time the plaintiff repossessed the vehicle. The defendants' equitable title in the item was limited to the extent of their payments. The vehicle therefore continued to be registered in the name of the
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plaintiff. For that reason, the plaintiff had no obstacle in obtaining a writ of replevin when the defendants failed in their payments. Because the plaintiff elected to resell the vehicle while at the same time he intended to collect it from the defendants under the sale agreement, he had a duty to mitigate damages forthe benefit of the defendants. He contends here that he discharged that duty by his sale of the vehicle for $500.00. There is a problem in his contention because he testified at the hearing on damages that when he advertised the motor vehicle for resale, three interested purchasers responded. At least one of these persons offered to buy the vehicle for $2,500.00. The plaintiff testified on direct examination that he could have sold the vehicle for$2,500.00. Yet, he sold it to the person who offered to buy it for $500.00. The plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages on that higher offer. He had an opportunity to make the $2,500.00. But he elected not to go through the sale and to collect the balance of what he had waived in the purchase offer from the defendants. He repossessed the vehicle from the defendants and resold it at his will, and now seeks judgment against the defendants for the full price of the item they at no time
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owned. I must deny this relief, except to the amount of $240.00 which has been heretofore paid, which amount shall apply to the sale price of the vehicle.
The
denial of the relief sought by the plaintiff for the payment of the full sale price of the motor vehicle does not set the defendants free from liability to the plaintiff for their possession and use of the item during the sale contract period until repossession by the plaintiff. Their use not only benefited themselves, but it denied the plaintiff such benefit. Again, this is unjust enrichment. The defendants must repair the damage they caused the plaintiff during the period of possession and use of the vehicle. The resulting question in this instance is, the extent of the defendants' damages to the plaintiff.
[20] While I note that most courts in the United States measure the amount of damages by the value of rental fee on rented motor vehicles, I feel in this case that the Court will have to look atthe agreement underwhich the defendants took possession and use of the vehicle from the plaintiff and assess damages from it.
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The
sale agreement between the parties implies that in consideration for the defendant's possession and use of the vehicle prior to transfer of title,they would pay the plaintiff $100 per month, commencing August 15, 1985 until the sale price was paid in full. When that was completed, the plaintiff would transfer title to the defendants. The defendants therefore continued in possession and use of the vehicle until the plaintiff repossessed it on October 11, 1985 through the Court. The value of the defendants' possession and use of the vehicle is thus, $100 per month. They are liable to the plaintiff for the three months of possession and use at $100 per month.
Fourth, as to punitive damages - $1,000.00. The plaintiff initially by his pleadings sought for $5,000.00 punitive damages against the defendants. The amount was reduced to $400 or equivalent to attorney's fee as would be incurred by the prosecution of this action, but he finally revised the amount to $1,000.00 on oral argument at the close of this hearing.
The plaintiff contends in support of his request for the award of punitive damages, that defendant Ladore, after the plaintiff had
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once obtained the vehicle by paying for repairs at Abello's shop, took the vehicle from PCR, where further repair service was also performed at plaintiff's request. He contends that at that time, Ladore knew he did not have title to the vehicle because the purchase price had not been paid. He knew he had made no payments in accordance with the sale agreement. The plaintiff contends that the defendant's action goes beyond merely breaching a contract, but constitutes also an intentional malicious wrongdoing in conscious disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. I agree. Not only this, but the defendants, after having obtained the vehicle for rent, appeared to be deceitful in their possession and use of the vehicle as bailees. They caused damage twice to the vehicle but did not see it fit to report each damage to the plaintiff. They kept possession of the vehicle and refused to return it to the plaintiff but avoided plaintiff in order to continue in the use of the chattel. The plaintiff had had to resort to this Court in replevin. This is a gross wanton disregard of plaintiff's possessive and ownership right over the vehicle.
[21-22] Punitive damages are synonymous to "exem-
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plary," "vindictive", damages. They are sometimes called "smart money." Punitive or exemplary damages are allowed and awarded as a punishment to the defendant and as a warning and example to deter him and others from committing like offenses in the future. Under this theory such damages are allowed on grounds of public policy and in the interest of society and for public benefit, not as compensatory damages, but rather in addition to such damages. 22 Am Jur. 2d. Damages, Section 237. The acts of the defendants are classic illustration of the kind of acts for which the law allows damages to punish the doer for having done, and to deter the doer and others from doing them again.
[22-24] What I need to determine in awarding punitive damages is the amount that will adequately serve its purpose but reasonable for the circumstances of the parties. In assessing exemplary or punitive damages, the nature, extent, and enormity of the wrong, the intent of the party committing it, and, generally, all the circumstances attending to the particular transaction involved, including any mitigating circumstances which may operate to reduce without wholly defeating such damages, may be taken into
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consideration, and so, as a rule, may the financial and social condition and standing of the party. See 22 Am Jur 2d. Damages, Section 263, and Annotations in 16 ALR 838, s. 123 ALR 1136. Punitive damages are incapable of definite ascertainment and from their nature cannot be governed or measured by any precise rules. Motor Equipment Co. v. McLaughlin, 156 Kan. 258;133 P2d 149. The general doctrine, however, is that the punitive damages awarded must bear some reasonable relation to the injury inflicted and the cause thereof. Flame Cool Co. v. United Mine Workers, 303 P2d 39, 97 ALR 2d 1136, cert den 371 US 891, 9 L ed 2d 125, 83 S Ct 186. Also see 33 ALR 398, s. 17 ALR 2d 548 Sec. 9. Such damages may not be awarded in a case where the amount of compensatory damages is adequate to punish the defendant. In a case where compensatory damages are not adequate for the purpose of punishment, only such an additional amount should be awarded as, taken together with the compensatory damages, will be sufficientforthatpurpose. Pendleton v.Norfolk and W.R.Co.82 W. Va 270, 95 SE 941, 16 ALR 761.
[25] The amount to be awarded in this event rests in the
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discretion of this Court, having regard to all the circumstances of this case. This discretion is not to be arbitrary or unlimited. This Court is not at liberty to award by way of punitive damages any amount, regardless of how much it may be. The amount should be that which the Court considers to be reasonable and adequate to punish the defendant, while at the same time add to the reparation to the plaintiff beyond the compensatory damages awarded. Taking these into account, I consider $1,000.00 to be rather excessive. I have allowed compensatory damages for the rental, repairs cost, and possession and use of the vehicle. I denied full sale price because it was the plaintiff's own decision to sell the vehicle for $500 instead of $2,500 to the interested purchasers. As between the defendants, it is the wife who is employed as a police officer. It is common knowledge that wages of police officers are unfortunately low. I feel that an amount less than $1,000.00 in punitive damages, in addition to the compensatory damages will adequately punish the defendants.
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Accordingly, punitive damages are assessed against the defendants in the amount of $400.00.
JUDGMENT
Accordingly, default judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants as follows:
A. DAMAGES
1. Rental for 38 days at $20.00/day $760.00
2. Vehicle repairs $310.00
3.
a. Sale price of vehicle $240.00
b. Use of vehicle, three months at
$100/month $300.00
4. Punitive damages $400.00
5. Attorney's fees $400.00
6.
Court
Cost $ 1.00
TOTAL DAMAGES $ 2,411.00
B. DEDUCTIONS
1. Deposit of funds $1,000.00
Current damages $1,411.00
C. Nine per cent (9%) per annum interest on judgment is assessed against the defendants from entry of this judgment.