Eneriko Alfons v. Andolin(1989)

POHNPEI LAW REPORTS

VOL.3A

[3A PN.L.R.547]

ENERIKO ALFONS, NELSON APINER, WELDON ELESHA,

REED JEFBEN, FRITZ TARO, SIRO ROSEN AND WHEELER MALAKAI,

Plaintiffs

ANDOLIN KUBO,

Defendant

Pohnpei Civil Action No. 180-86

Trial Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court

July 17, 1989

Action for the recovery of compensation under an oral contract of employment for work performed in Kosrae by the plaintiffs for the defendant. The evidence, which was uncontradicted, showed that during the negotiation of terms of employment the defendant stated in his offer that he would be responsible for the cost of food consumed by the plaintiffs while in his employment in Kosrae. The defendant later changed his mind. The Trial Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court, JUDAH C. JOHNNY, Associate Justice, granting the complaint of the plaintiffs, held (1) that the defendant could not avoid that which he assented to merely because he had changed his mind or on the guise of lack of intent; and (2) that outstanding amounts due for store charges in respect of goods purchased by the plaintiffs on credit while in Kosrae were not part of the contract in issue therefore the Court would not pass on the subject.

1. Contracts - Contract of Employment - Intention of Parties Assent - Estoppel

Although mutual assent is necessary, in certain cases the parties are estopped to deny that their words or acts accurately express their actual intent - in other words, mutual assent is conclusively presumed from an expression of mutual assent.

[3A PN.L.R.548]

2. Contracts - Contract of Employment - Intention of Parties - Assent

Assent in the sense of the law is a matter of overt acts and expressions, not of inward unanimity in motives, design, or interpretation of words. The meeting of minds, which is assential to the formation of a contract, is not determined by the secret intentions of the parties, but by their expressed or manifest intentions. (17 Am Jur 2nd, Contracts, Section 19).

3. Contracts - Contract of Employment - Terms

The Court will refrain from passing upon a subject which is not part of the terms of an employment contract in issue and on which there is inadequate evidence.

4. Evidence - Uncontradicted Testimony - Credibility of Party Directly Interested In Event

Testimony given by an interested person or party should not be wholly disregarded or arbitrarily rejected, but should be accepted as proof of the issue for which it is tendered, where it is uncontradicted and consists of facts, as distinguished from opinions, and is not essentially illegal, inherently improbable or unreasonable, contrary to natural laws, opposed to knowledge, or contradictory within itself.

Counsel for Plaintiffs: Stephen R. Skipton, Esq.,

Micronesian Legal Services Corporation,

Pohnpei State

Counsel for Defendant: Joseph S. Phillip, Esq.

JUDAH C. JOHNNY, Associate Justice

This matter was commenced originally by the complaint of four plaintiffs, including Eneriko Alfons, Nelsin Apiner, Wildon

[3A PN.L.R.549]

Elesha and Reed Jefben. Three persons subsequently joined as party plaintiffs, namely Fritz Taro, Wheeler Malakai, and Siro Rosen. The plaintiffs and the defendant are citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia, legal residents of the State of Pohnpei.

The plaintiffs seek payment, by the defendant, of unpaid compensation, for work they performed for the defendant.

At pretrial, the parties agreed that all the plaintiffs were employed by the defendant under an oral employment contract, to work for the defendant in the construction of a hotel in the State of Kosrae, the Federated States of Micronesia, during the months of May through September, 1986.

Trial started with three remaining issues to prove, that is:

1. if the parties agreed that the defendant was allowed to deduct the cost of food and store charges from each plaintiff's wages;

2. the total of hours each plaintiff performed work for the defendant; and

3. the agreed-upon hourly rate of compensation for each plaintiff for services, rendered to the defendant.

[3A PN.L.R.550]

The plaintiffs put up their evidence, and during the testimony of their fifth witness, the parties stipulated that the following party plaintiffs worked for the following total hours at the following rates of compensation:

1. Nelson Apiner - 400 hours at $1.50/hour

2. Welden Elehsa - 228 hours at $1.50hour

3. Reed Jefben - 356 hours at $1.50/hour

4. Fritz Taro - 624 hours at $1.50/hour

5. Wheeler Malakai - 360 hours at $1.50/hour

Having thus stipulated, what remained to be tested by evidence were:

1. if the parties agreed to deduct cost of food and store charges from each plaintiff's wages; and

2. the total hours worked by plaintiffs Eneriko Alfons and Siro Rausen, and the agreed-upon rate of compensation.

Evidence was brought and is weighed and discussed as following.

[1-2] All the witnesses of the plaintiffs testified that in negotiating their employment, the defendant stated in his offer of

[3A PN.L.R.551]

employment that he would be responsible for food expenses so that the plaintiffs would not be charged for the food they consume while employed. In support of the plaintiffs' evidence, Nasar Luzama, the sole witness of the defendant, who was a former employee of the defendant on the same hotel project, testified that when the defendant offered him the job to go to Kosrae and work on the hotel construction, the defendant also stated to him that his food charges, while on the Kosrae project, would be paid by the defendant himself. This witness accepted the employment offer and left to Kosrae, only to find that the defendant refused to pay for this food charges. He quit the job and returned to Pohnpei. The evidence proves that the parties agreed that defendant Kubo would not charge food expenses to the plaintiffs. This being in the employment contract, this defendant cannot now avoid that which he assented to merely because he has changed his mind or on the guise of lack of intent.

"It is sometimes said... that although mutual assent is necessary, in certain cases the parties are estopped to deny that their words or acts accurately express their actual intent - in other words, that mutual assent is conclusively presumed from an expression of mutual assent." Lampson v._Horton - Holden Hotel Co. 193 Iowa 355, 185

[3A PN.L.R.552]

NW 472, 26 ALR 465.

"Assent in the sense of the law is a matter of overt acts and expressions, not of inward unanimity in motives, design, or interpretation of words. The meeting of minds, which isessential to the formation of a contract, is not determined by the secret intentions of the parties, but by their expressed or manifested intentions. 17 Am Jur 2d, Contract, Sec. 19.

That being the contract, the plaintiffs cannot be made to pay food charges.

[3] There was no discussion by the parties at the time of making of the employment contract, about store charges. However, there is showing that when the plaintiffs were in Kosrae working on the hotel, they obtained goods from a store on credit. Not all of them would stipulate to the amount owing and outstanding. Since these are not part of the contract in issue, and the evidence is inadequate, this Court will not pass upon the subject. The parties are free to treat this separately herein or in another action.

Evidence was also brought by plaintiffs Alfons and Rosen to the effect that they entered into the contract to work for the

[3A PN.L.R.553]

defendant as carpenters, at the compensation rate of $2.00 per hour. Each of these plaintiffs brought evidence that they worked for a total of 353 hours. No evidence was offered by the defendant to challange the credibility of this evidence.

[4] Cases differ in the United States on the question relating to the weight to be given to uncontradicted testimony of a party to an action or any party directly interested in the event of the trial, assuming that he is competent to testify. It is held in some cases that the trier of fact, whether court or jury, is not justified in disregarding the uncontradicted testimony of a party or interested witness. Kelly v. Jones, 290111375,125 NE 334, 8 ALR 792; Miller's Will, 49 Or. 452, 90 P 1002. Many cases however follow the rule to the effect that such testimony does not conclusively establish the facts testified to, because the credibility of such a witness presents a question for jury consideration. While courts in many instances have this rule, the rule has generally been not applied, except in those instances where the testimony, while not actually contradicted, is infected with such elements as, where the testimony is inconsistent with natural probabilities, extraordinary, incomplete,

[3A PN.L.R.554]

or such that men of reason and fairness may entertain differing views to its truth. A more flexible view is that where the uncontradicted testimony of an interested witness is unaffected by any conflicting inferences to be drawn from it, and is not improbable, extraordinary orsurprising in its nature, orthere is no otherground for hesitating to accept it as the truth, there is no reason for denying the finding or verdict dictated by the evidence. In accord with this view, is the principle that testimony given by an interested person or party should not be wholly disregarded orarbitrarily,rejected, but should be accepted as proof of the issue for which it is tendered, where it is uncontradicted and consists of facts, as distinguised from opinions, and is not essentially illegal, inherently improbable or unreasonable, contrary to natural laws, opposed to knowledge, or contradictory within itself. The testimony of Alfons and Rosen agree. Nothing in evidence contradicts their testimonies. They should be given credence.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that:

1. The plaintiffs have judgment against the defendant in

[3A PN.L.R.555]

the following amounts:

a. Nelson Apiner for 400 hours of work, at $1.50 per hour = $600.00

b. Welden Elelsha, for 228 hours of work, at $1.50 per hour = $342.00

c. Reed Jefben, for 356 hours of work, at $1.50 per hour = $534.00

d. Fritz Taro, for 624 hours of work, at $1.50 per hour = $936.00

e. Wheeler Malakai, for 360 hours of work, at $1.50 per hour = $540.00

f. Eneriko Alfons, for 353 hours of work, at $2.00 per hour = $706.00

g. Siro Rousen, for 353 hours of work, at $2.00 per hour = $706.00

2. No food expenses may be deducted from any of the plaintiffs' wages.

3. The parties are free to agree or make arrangements regarding the payment of store credits, either subsequently in this action, or separately.


	POHNPEI LAW REPORTS VOL.3A [3A PN.L.R.547] ENERIKO ALFONS, NELSON APINER, WELDON ELESHA, REED JEFBEN, FRITZ TARO, SIRO ROSEN AND WHEELER MALAKAI, Plaintiffs v. ANDOLIN KUBO, Defendant Pohnpei Civil Action No. 180-86 Trial Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court July 17, 1989 Action for the recovery of compensation under an oral contract of employment for work performed in Kosrae by the plaintiffs for the defendant. The evidence, which was uncontradicted, showed that during the negotiation of terms of employment the defendant stated in his offer that he would be responsible for the cost of food consumed by the plaintiffs while in his employment in Kosrae. The defendant later changed his mind. The Trial Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court, JUDAH C. JOHNNY, Associate Justice, granting the complaint of the plaintiffs, held (1) that the defendant could not avoid that which he assented to merely because he had changed his mind or on the guise of lack of intent; and (2) that outstanding amounts due for store charges in respect of goods purchased by the plaintiffs on credit while in Kosrae were not part of the contract in issue therefore the Court would not pass on the subject. 1. Contracts - Contract of Employment - Intention of Parties Assent - Estoppel Although mutual assent is necessary, in certain cases the parties are estopped to deny that their words or acts accurately express their actual intent - in other words, mutual assent is conclusively presumed from an expression of mutual assent. [3A PN.L.R.548] 2. Contracts - Contract of Employment - Intention of Parties - Assent Assent in the sense of the law is a matter of overt acts and expressions, not of inward unanimity in motives, design, or interpretation of words. The meeting of minds, which is assential to the formation of a contract, is not determined by the secret intentions of the parties, but by their expressed or manifest intentions. (17 Am Jur 2nd, Contracts, Section 19). 3. Contracts - Contract of Employment - Terms The Court will refrain from passing upon a subject which is not part of the terms of an employment contract in issue and on which there is inadequate evidence. 4. Evidence - Uncontradicted Testimony - Credibility of Party Directly Interested In Event Testimony given by an interested person or party should not be wholly disregarded or arbitrarily rejected, but should be accepted as proof of the issue for which it is tendered, where it is uncontradicted and consists of facts, as distinguished from opinions, and is not essentially illegal, inherently improbable or unreasonable, contrary to natural laws, opposed to knowledge, or contradictory within itself. Counsel for Plaintiffs: Stephen R. Skipton, Esq., Micronesian Legal Services Corporation, Pohnpei State Counsel for Defendant: Joseph S. Phillip, Esq. JUDAH C. JOHNNY, Associate Justice This matter was commenced originally by the complaint of four plaintiffs, including Eneriko Alfons, Nelsin Apiner, Wildon [3A PN.L.R.549] Elesha and Reed Jefben. Three persons subsequently joined as party plaintiffs, namely Fritz Taro, Wheeler Malakai, and Siro Rosen. The plaintiffs and the defendant are citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia, legal residents of the State of Pohnpei. The plaintiffs seek payment, by the defendant, of unpaid compensation, for work they performed for the defendant. At pretrial, the parties agreed that all the plaintiffs were employed by the defendant under an oral employment contract, to work for the defendant in the construction of a hotel in the State of Kosrae, the Federated States of Micronesia, during the months of May through September, 1986. Trial started with three remaining issues to prove, that is: 1. if the parties agreed that the defendant was allowed to deduct the cost of food and store charges from each plaintiff's wages; 2. the total of hours each plaintiff performed work for the defendant; and 3. the agreed-upon hourly rate of compensation for each plaintiff for services, rendered to the defendant. [3A PN.L.R.550] The plaintiffs put up their evidence, and during the testimony of their fifth witness, the parties stipulated that the following party plaintiffs worked for the following total hours at the following rates of compensation: 1. Nelson Apiner - 400 hours at $1.50/hour 2. Welden Elehsa - 228 hours at $1.50hour 3. Reed Jefben - 356 hours at $1.50/hour 4. Fritz Taro - 624 hours at $1.50/hour 5. Wheeler Malakai - 360 hours at $1.50/hour Having thus stipulated, what remained to be tested by evidence were: 1. if the parties agreed to deduct cost of food and store charges from each plaintiff's wages; and 2. the total hours worked by plaintiffs Eneriko Alfons and Siro Rausen, and the agreed-upon rate of compensation. Evidence was brought and is weighed and discussed as following. [1-2] All the witnesses of the plaintiffs testified that in negotiating their employment, the defendant stated in his offer of [3A PN.L.R.551] employment that he would be responsible for food expenses so that the plaintiffs would not be charged for the food they consume while employed. In support of the plaintiffs' evidence, Nasar Luzama, the sole witness of the defendant, who was a former employee of the defendant on the same hotel project, testified that when the defendant offered him the job to go to Kosrae and work on the hotel construction, the defendant also stated to him that his food charges, while on the Kosrae project, would be paid by the defendant himself. This witness accepted the employment offer and left to Kosrae, only to find that the defendant refused to pay for this food charges. He quit the job and returned to Pohnpei. The evidence proves that the parties agreed that defendant Kubo would not charge food expenses to the plaintiffs. This being in the employment contract, this defendant cannot now avoid that which he assented to merely because he has changed his mind or on the guise of lack of intent. "It is sometimes said... that although mutual assent is necessary, in certain cases the parties are estopped to deny that their words or acts accurately express their actual intent - in other words, that mutual assent is conclusively presumed from an expression of mutual assent." Lampson v._Horton - Holden Hotel Co. 193 Iowa 355, 185 [3A PN.L.R.552] NW 472, 26 ALR 465. "Assent in the sense of the law is a matter of overt acts and expressions, not of inward unanimity in motives, design, or interpretation of words. The meeting of minds, which isessential to the formation of a contract, is not determined by the secret intentions of the parties, but by their expressed or manifested intentions. 17 Am Jur 2d, Contract, Sec. 19. That being the contract, the plaintiffs cannot be made to pay food charges. [3] There was no discussion by the parties at the time of making of the employment contract, about store charges. However, there is showing that when the plaintiffs were in Kosrae working on the hotel, they obtained goods from a store on credit. Not all of them would stipulate to the amount owing and outstanding. Since these are not part of the contract in issue, and the evidence is inadequate, this Court will not pass upon the subject. The parties are free to treat this separately herein or in another action. Evidence was also brought by plaintiffs Alfons and Rosen to the effect that they entered into the contract to work for the [3A PN.L.R.553] defendant as carpenters, at the compensation rate of $2.00 per hour. Each of these plaintiffs brought evidence that they worked for a total of 353 hours. No evidence was offered by the defendant to challange the credibility of this evidence. [4] Cases differ in the United States on the question relating to the weight to be given to uncontradicted testimony of a party to an action or any party directly interested in the event of the trial, assuming that he is competent to testify. It is held in some cases that the trier of fact, whether court or jury, is not justified in disregarding the uncontradicted testimony of a party or interested witness. Kelly v. Jones, 290111375,125 NE 334, 8 ALR 792; Miller's Will, 49 Or. 452, 90 P 1002. Many cases however follow the rule to the effect that such testimony does not conclusively establish the facts testified to, because the credibility of such a witness presents a question for jury consideration. While courts in many instances have this rule, the rule has generally been not applied, except in those instances where the testimony, while not actually contradicted, is infected with such elements as, where the testimony is inconsistent with natural probabilities, extraordinary, incomplete, [3A PN.L.R.554] or such that men of reason and fairness may entertain differing views to its truth. A more flexible view is that where the uncontradicted testimony of an interested witness is unaffected by any conflicting inferences to be drawn from it, and is not improbable, extraordinary orsurprising in its nature, orthere is no otherground for hesitating to accept it as the truth, there is no reason for denying the finding or verdict dictated by the evidence. In accord with this view, is the principle that testimony given by an interested person or party should not be wholly disregarded orarbitrarily,rejected, but should be accepted as proof of the issue for which it is tendered, where it is uncontradicted and consists of facts, as distinguised from opinions, and is not essentially illegal, inherently improbable or unreasonable, contrary to natural laws, opposed to knowledge, or contradictory within itself. The testimony of Alfons and Rosen agree. Nothing in evidence contradicts their testimonies. They should be given credence. Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that: 1. The plaintiffs have judgment against the defendant in [3A PN.L.R.555] the following amounts: a. Nelson Apiner for 400 hours of work, at $1.50 per hour = $600.00 b. Welden Elelsha, for 228 hours of work, at $1.50 per hour = $342.00 c. Reed Jefben, for 356 hours of work, at $1.50 per hour = $534.00 d. Fritz Taro, for 624 hours of work, at $1.50 per hour = $936.00 e. Wheeler Malakai, for 360 hours of work, at $1.50 per hour = $540.00 f. Eneriko Alfons, for 353 hours of work, at $2.00 per hour = $706.00 g. Siro Rousen, for 353 hours of work, at $2.00 per hour = $706.00 2. No food expenses may be deducted from any of the plaintiffs' wages. 3. The parties are free to agree or make arrangements regarding the payment of store credits, either subsequently in this action, or separately.