POHNPEI SUPREME COURT REPORTS
VOL. 2
[2 P. S. Ct. R 358]
IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF
LEON JOEL (LUHKENMOANLAP, KITTI), LEON JOEL,
Petitioner
Pohnpei Civil Action No. 79-87
Appellate Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court
April 30, 1987
Petition for a writ of certiorari or in the alternative a writ of mandamus directing the Presiding Judge of the Kitti Municipal Court to withdraw or strike off his requirement for the Kitti Legislature to submit to the Court for consideration any and all documents to be tendered in evidence in an impeachment case against the petitioner pending before the Municipal Court before such documents were given to the petitioner for his examination. The petitioner after argument withdrew his petition for certiorari and mandamus but verbally moved the Court to exercise its jurisdiction to remove the impeachment case from the Kitti Municipal Court to this Court. A jurisdictional question was raised by the respondent but by stipulation it was conceded by the parties that the Pohnpei State Supreme Court had general power over inferior courts, including the Kitti Municipal Court. The evidence showed that all that the Kitti Municipal Court had done was the issuance of a schedule of preliminary actions to trial.
The Appellate Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court, PER CURIAM, denying the motion, held that the Pohnpei Supreme Court had power, the exercise of which was based on sound discretion, under Section 67 of this Pohnpei Judicial Act, S.L. 2L-16082 as amended by S.L.2L-239-83, to transfer the impeachment case to the State Supreme Court, but there being no showing in the case before the Court that circumstances existing in the impeachment proceeding before the Kitti Municipal Court warranted the interference by the State Supreme Court, the Court would not interfere with matters in the Municipal Court.
1. Courts - Jurisdiction
The Pohnpei Supreme Court has general power and may invoke its jurisdiction in a case pending before any Pohnpei State inferior court.
2. Courts - Jurisdiction
The jurisdictional relationship between the State and local governments in Pohnpei is expressed in Article 2 of the Pohnpei Constitution which declares that the Constitution is the supreme law of Pohnpei and
[2 P. S. Ct. R 359]
Article, 10, Section 4 (1) which declares that the Pohnpei Supreme Court is the highest Court of Pohnpei.
3. Constitutional Law - Supremacy of State Constitution, Laws, and Treaties
With respect to the governments therein, the Pohnpei Constitution together with all laws made in pursuance thereof and treaties made under the authority of the State are by express declaration of Article 2 of the Constitution, the supreme law of Pohnpei.
4. Constitutional Law - Supremacy of State Constitution.
As declared in Article 2 of the Pohnpei Constitution, the supremacy of the Constitution as law, is absolute and without qualification.
5. Constitutional Law - Force and Effect of State Constitution
The Pohnpei Constitution is binding on all officers and departments of both the State and local governments, including every court (whether it derives its authority from a municipality or from the State), individual members of the Legislature, and the whole people of the State of Pohnpei, governing and restraining their act and conduct, whether exercised by their representatives in the State Legislature or by their representatives as provided for in the municipal constitutions.
6. Constitutional Law - Supremacy of State Constitution
Public policy of a municipality cannot be allowed to override the positive guaranties of the Pohnpei State Constitution.
7. Courts - Judicial Notice - Constitution
The State and Municipal Courts shall take judicial notice of the provisions of the Pohnpei State Constitution.
8. Constitutional Law - Municipal Constitutions
The Constitution of a municipality in Pohnpei, so far as it is consistent with the provisions of the State Constitution, is the fundamental law of the municipality, and a part of its supreme law.
9. Constitutional Law - Municipal Constitutions - Interpretation and Effect
A municipal constitution is to be interpreted and effect given to it as the
[2 P. S. Ct. R 360]
paramount taw, although applicable provisions of the State Constitution, within their proper sphere of operation, are dominant authority in interpretation and enforcement of municipal constitutional provisions which may be affected by the State organic law provisions.
10. Courts - Jurisdiction
The Pohnpei Supreme Court as the highest court of Pohnpei, has unlimited power, except to the extent limited by the State Constitution or the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.
11. Courts - Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the Pohnpei Supreme Court as relates the courts in the local governments is not limited by the Pohnpei State Constitution.
12. Courts - Jurisdiction
Under the Pohnpei State Constitution the Trial Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases within the jurisdiction of Pohnpei, and has appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of all inferior courts and adjudicatory bodies.
13. Jurisdiction - Definition
Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine a cause and enforce the court's decree.
14. Courts - Hierarchy of Courts
A court is inferior to another when it is placed under the supervision, or appellate control of another court.
15. Constitutional Law - Interpretation of Pohnpei Constitution - Intent of Framers of Constitution
While Article 14 of the Pohnpei Constitution allows the municipal governments to establish their own constitutions the intent of the framers of the Pohnpei Constitution is that local constitutions must not be inconsistent with the Pohnpei Constitution or State law.
16. Courts - Jurisdiction
Under the Pohnpei Judicial Ad of 1982, S.L.2L-160-82, Section 20, as
[2 P. S. Ct. R 361]
amended by S.L.2L-3L-6-84 the State Court may take jurisdiction of any case pending before other courts of Pohnpei State, and under S.L.-2L160-82, Section 68 as amended by S.L.2L-239-83 appeal from the final decision of a municipal court lies in the Trial Division of the State Court.
17. Courts - Hierarchy of Courts
Community Courts are inferior in status in relation to the Pohnpei Supreme Court.
18. Constitutional Law - Municipal Constitutions - Validity of Provisions
A municipal constitutional provision that is in conflict with State constitutional provision that community courts are inferior in status in relation to the Pohnpei Supreme court is invalid to the extent of the conflict.
19. Courts - Jurisdiction - Intent of Organic Law
Where Section 60 of the Judicial Act of 1982 S.L.2.L-160-82 as amended by S.L.2.L-239-83 and further amended by S.L. 1 L-4-85 provides that "A municipal court may be established pursuant to this Act in each municipality or town of Pohnpei which shall so elect by local constitution or ordinance to have such court" it is clear in consideration of the State Constitution and the Act, that the intent of these organic laws is the creation of a system of courts in which the State Supreme Court shall have superintendent authority over all courts in all levels of government.
20. Courts - Jurisdiction
The Pohnpei Supreme Court may exercise jurisdiction in any matter even though the subject of the matter before the Court may be shared concurrently between the Court and a Municipal Court.
21. Prerogative Writs - Certiorari - Purpose
The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the court for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order that the superior court may determine from the face of the record whether the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded according to the essential requirements of the law. (12 Am Jur 2d, Certiorari, Section 2.)
[2 P. S. Ct. R 362]
22. Prerogative Writs - Certiorari - Purpose
The principal office of the writ of certiorari is to determine whether the conduct of an inferior tribunal was within its jurisdiction and otherwise legal; it is to control the action of an inferior tribunal and to keep it within its jurisdiction.
23. Prerogative Writs - Certiorari
Ordinarily, a writ of certiorari is available to review final judgments or decrees, and will be refused where there has been no final judgment or order, and the proceeding in which the wait is sought is still pending and undetermined in the lower court.
24. Prerogative Writs - Certiorari
Where an action is pending before a municipal court and all that the court has done is the issuance of a schedule of preliminary actions to trial and the court has not finally rendered a judgment certiorari in the action against the municipal court will be refused by the Pohnpei State Supreme Court.
25. Prerogative Writs - Mandamus
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction directed to some inferior court requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified. (52 Am Jur, 2d., Mandamus, Section 5).
26. Prerogative Writs - Mandamus - Purpose
Mandamus is employed only as a remedy for inaction on the part of the person to whom it is directed.
27. Prerogative Writs - Mandamus - Purpose
Mandamus is in no sense a preventive remedy, but is prospective merely, its purpose and object being to command performance, not desistance. (52 Am Jur. 2d Mandamus, Section 9).
28. Prerogative Writs - Mandamus - Purpose
The purpose of mandamus is to stimulate action, pursuant to some duty, and not to cause the respondent to undo action already taken, or
[2 P. S. Ct. R 363]
to correct or revise such action, however erroneous it may have been.
29. Prerogative Writs - Mandamus - Purpose
Where the relief sought in a petition for a writ of mandamus is for a municipal court to refrain from carrying out the provisions of an order made by the court setting forth the schedule of actions to be taken before the trial of an impeachment action, the essence of the petition is to make the municipal court desist from action or to undo its order, thus mandamus is inappropriate.
30. Prerogative Writs - Mandamus
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which is available only in cases in which the usual forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief.
31. Prerogative Writs - Mandamus
In order for a writ of mandamus to issue the petition shall show that the petitioner has exhausted all available means to obtain relief, or that there is no other means by which to obtain relief.
32. Removal of Cases
There are two modes by which cases may be removed from community courts to the State Supreme Court under the Pohnpei Judicial Act of 1982, S.L.2L-160-82, Section 67, as amended by S.L.2L-239-83, namely:
1. by order of the municipal court certifying a matter before it to the Trial Division of the State Supreme Court, but the municipal court may not transfer a case to the Trial Division of the State Supreme Court without the consent of the Trial Division of the State Supreme Court; and
2. by order of the Trial Division of the State Supreme Court certified to the municipal court in which the case is pending, which court shall take no further action on the merits of the case but may make orders of a temporary nature which justice may require and which are not inconsistent with the order of the Trial Division of the State Supreme Court.
[2 P. S. Ct. R 364]
33. Removal of cases - Doctrine of Federal Abstention
In consonance with the doctrine of federal abstention the Pohnpei Supreme Court will ordinarily abstain from interfering with matters of municipal courts, unless fundamental rights guaranteed by the Pohnpei State Constitution are invaded, or enforcement of municipal laws appears otherwise repugnant to the State Constitution, laws or treaties of the State of Pohnpei.
34. Removal of Cases - Courts - Powers
Although the Pohnpei Supreme Court possesses the power to remove cases or interfere with municipal matters, that power is not unqualified, but is to be exerted in the exercise of sound discretion.
35. Removal of Cases - Courts - Powers
The due administration of justice in the municipal courts should not be interfered with, save in rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist.
36. Removal of Cases - Courts - Powers
Where there is no showing that circumstances existing in impeachment proceedings before a municipal court warrants interference by the State Supreme Court, the Court will not interfere in the proceedings, and the abstention of the Court is no abdication of jurisdiction but only a postponement of its exercise.
Counsel for Petitioner: Sungiwo Hadley
Counsel for Respondent: Dickson H. Santos
CORAM:
CARL KOHLER, Associate Justice,
YOSTER CARL, Associate Justice, and
JUDAH C. JOHNNY, Associate Justice
PER
CURIAM
This matter comes originally before this Court in the nature of
[2 P. S. Ct. R 365]
two alternative petitions, first by virtue of a petition for a Writ of Certiorari, and in the alternative, second, on petition for a Writ of Mandamus.
While not fully represented, to the extent that this Court gathers from the pleadings and representations of counsel, matters precedent to the filing of the petitions in this Court pertain to a pending impeachment proceedings against Petitioner Joel, as Luhkenmoanlap of Kitti Municipality. Luhkenmoanlap is the equivalent of chief executives in the local governments of this State. The impeachment is instituted under provisions of the Kitti Municipal Constitution and statute. The petitioner is currently temporarily suspended from duty pending review of the matters of impeachment by the Kitti Municipal Court.
By way of scheduling, the Presiding Judge of the Kitti Municipal Court issued a notice of hearing, setting forth a calendar of actions to be performed by parties to the impeachment, in which the Isokohnedi (legislature) is required to submit to the court, due on April 21, 1987, all matters that support the impeachment of the petitioner, stating in parenthesis, all material evidence that was needed. The petitioner was required to submit to the court due May
[2 P. S. Ct. R 366]
1, 1987,
all material evidence which he required in the proceedings, with May 6,
1987, the last day of submission by either party, any further matters that
might be needed to be submitted.
On the basis of actions that have taken place in connection with the impeachment; the petitioner brings to this Court these petitions, advanced by the petition for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, and, in the alternative, by the petition for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus.
The Isokohnedi, appearing as respondent, filed an answer.
We will consider below, the issues in this matter in the order as they are raised by the pleadings:
I. Jurisdiction
The ambiguity of the respondent's assertion of jurisdiction requires us at the outset to ascertain jurisdiction. Generally, the respondent's answer in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 could be construed that it is denying existence of jurisdiction in this Court to take the matter by its Writ or Order. The respondent contends in its response that the Kitti Municipal Court is unique in that it is not like other Municipal Courts that have continued to exist under the umbrella of the jurisdiction of the Pohnpei Supreme Court. It
[2 P. S. Ct. R 367]
further contends by its pleadings that Section 20 of the Pohnpei Judiciary Act does not permit the Pohnpei Supreme Court to remove any matter from the other courts, where no request has been made by that court.
[1] On oral argument, the respondent clarified its position, and it is therefore stipulated that this Court does have a general power to invoke its jurisdiction as in this case, in any inferior courts, including the Kitti Municipal Court.
Although the question of jurisdiction is stipulated in this case, in view of the apparent diverse views of scholars and the unaddressed question of jurisdictional relationship between the levels of government in this State, and the developments in this matter that give rise to the subject, we feel it is appropriate that we briefly address the matter of jurisdiction, to begin to lay guidelines in the development of a jurisprudence in this State.
[2] The jurisdictional relationship between the governments in Pohnpei (state and local governments) is expressed in two organic laws of this State.
POHNPEI STATE CONSTITUTION
[2-7] First and foremost is the Pohnpei State Constitution.
[2 P. S. Ct. R 368]
We will consider below some pertinent provisions of that organic law:
1. Article 2 of the Pohnpei State Constitution declares;
"This Constitution in the supreme law of Pohnpei..."
In adopting that Article, the framers declared that they recognized that constitutions of political subdivisions of a country are usually subordinate to the national charter of that country.
They exemplified the political relationship of the levels of constitutional governments of this State to the constitutional system which exists in the United States of America. See Standing Committee Report No. 6, Committee on General Provisions, Pohnpei State Constitutional Convention, adopted on July 7,1983, on Committee Proposal No. 3 - Supremacy. In that context, we hold that the Constitution of the State of Pohnpei, with respect to the governments therein, together with all laws made in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under the authority of the State, are, by the express declaration of Article 2, the supreme law of the land. The supremacy of the State Constitution as law is declared without qualifications and is absolute. The State Constitution is binding on all officers and departments of both the State and local govern-
[2 P. S. Ct. R 369]
ments, including every court (whether it derives its authority from a municipality or from the State), individual members of the Legislature, and the whole people of the State of Pohnpei, governing and restraining their acts and conduct, whether exercised by their representatives in the State Legislature or by their representatives as provided for in the municipal constitutions. No public policy of a municipality can be allowed to override the positive guaranties of the State Constitution. It will be proper if any court, State and municipal alike, take judicial notice of the provisions of the State Constitution.
[8-9] The constitution of each municipality, so far as it is consistent with the provisions of the State Constitution, is the fundamental law of the municipality, and a part of its supreme law. A municipal constitution is to be interpreted and effect given to it as the paramount law, although applicable provisions of the State Constitution, within their proper sphere of operation, are dominant authority in interpretation and enforcement of municipal constitutional provisions which may be affected by the state organic provisions.
2. Article 10, Section 4 (1).
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[2,10-14] In the light of Article 2, Article 10, Section 4 (1) declares that,
"The Pohnpei Supreme Court ....is the highest court of Pohnpei."
It should follow therefore, in the spirit of supremacy as declared in Article 2, that the Pohnpei Supreme Court, being the "highest court of Pohnpei," it has unlimited power, except to the extent limited by the State Constitution or the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia. Nowhere in the State Constitution is there limitation of jurisdiction in the State Supreme Court as it relates to the courts in the local governments. The Constitution declares that the Trial Division of the Supreme Court has a two pronged jurisdiction; it has original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal cases within the jurisdiction of Pohnpei; it also has appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of all inferior courts and adjudicatory bodies. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a cause and enforce its decree. A court is inferior to another when it is placed under the supervision, or appellate control of another court.
[15] 3. Article 14, Section 2.
Article 14 of the Constitution should be read into Articles 4 and
[2 P. S. Ct. R 371]
10. Article 4 has declared supremacy of the State Constitution, and Article 10 declares superiority of the State court over all other courts and quasi-judicial bodies. In that respect, Article 14, while allowing the municipal governments to establish their own constitutions, declares,
"...such constitutions shall not be inconsistent with this Constitution or Pohnpei law..."
The framers declared the intent of this section to be that,
"[I] Local constitutions must not be inconsistent with this Constitution or State law."
POHNPEI JUDICIAL ACT OF 1982:
[16-18] 1. Section 20. Original jurisdiction: S.L. 2L 160-82, as amended by S.L. 3L-6-84, approved on February 12,1984, declares in Section 20,
"...The State Court ...may take jurisdiction of any case pending before other courts of this State..."
2. Section 68. Appeals. Section 68 of S.L.2L160-82, as added by S.L. 2L-239-83, effective January 20, 1984, declares,
"Appeal from the final decision of a municipal court lies in the Trial Division of the State Court."
[2 P. S. Ct. R 372]
This, in consonance with the Pohnpei Constitution, particularly Article 10, places the State Court in appellate jurisdiction over the community courts. As such, the community courts are placed in an "inferior courts" status with respect to the State Supreme Court. In our view, any municipal constitutional provision that is in conflict with this declaration is "invalid to the extent of conflict."
3. Section 60. Establishment.
(19-20) Section 60 of S.L. 2.L.-160-82, as amended by S.L. 2L-239-83 and further amended by S.L.1.L.-4-85, effective March 12, 1985, declares,
"A municipal court may be established pursuant to this Act in each municipality or town of Pohnpei which shall so elect by local constitution or ordinance to have such court..."
It is clear, therefore, in consideration of the State Constitution and the State Judicial Act, that the intent of these organic laws call for a system of courts in which the State Supreme Court shall have superintendent authority over all courts in all levels of government. It is our view therefore that jurisdiction exists in this Court, even though the subject of the matter before us may be shared concurrently between this Court and the Municipal Court of Kitti.
[2 P. S. Ct. R 373]
II. Writ of Certiorari
[21 ] Having found jurisdiction, we turn to the crux of this matter. The petitioner brought his petition in two alternative sequences. First, for issuance of a writ of certiorari. It was disclosed, on argument, that the Kitti Municipal Court, to which the petition pertains, has not made a final decision in the matter before it. The petitioner recognized it, and withdrew from his petition. In allowing the petitioner to withdraw, we recognize that,
. The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the court for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order that the superior court may determine from the face of the record whether the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded according to the essential requirements of the law." 12 Am Jur 2d Certiorari, Section 2.
[22-24] Clearly, the principal office of the writ is to determine whether the conduct of an inferior tribunal was within its jurisdiction and otherwise legal. It is to control the action of an inferior tribunal and to keep it within its jurisdiction. Ordinarily, a writ of certiorari is available to review final judgments or decrees, and will be refused where there has been no final judgment or order, and the proceeding in which the writ is sought is still pending and undetermined in the lower court. This is the situation in the matter
[2 P. S. Ct. R 374]
in the Kitti Municipal Court. That court has not finally rendered a judgment. All that it has done is the issuance of a schedule of preliminary actions to trial. There is nevertheless, no need for our ruling on the petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari in this matter since the petitioner withdrew the petition, except to grant withdrawal.
III. Writ of Mandamus
[25] Alternative to the issuance of a writ of certiorari, the petitioner sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Again, after argument, the petitioner sought leave to withdraw his petition. In allowing leave to withdraw, we wish to note that,
"Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction directed to some inferior court ,...requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified. .. "52 Am Jur 2d. Mandamus, Section 5.
[26-28j Mandamus is employed only as a remedy for inaction on the part of the person to whom it is directed. It is in no sense a preventive remedy, but is prospective merely, its purpose and object being to command performance, not desistance. See section 9, supra. Thus, its purpose is to stimulate action, pursuant to some duty, and not to cause the respondent to undo action
already taken; or to correct or revise such action, however errone-
[2 P. S. Ct. R 375]
ous it may have been. See Rives v. Justices of Superior Court, 330 Lass. 368, 113 NE 2d 817, app dismd, 346 US 919, 98 L Ed 414 74 SCt. 309, reh den 347 US 908, 98 L Ed 1066, 74 S. Ct. 426; State ex rel. Thomson v. Bobcock (Mont) 409 P2d 898 Also see State ex rel. Robinson v. Hutcherson, 180 Tenn 46, 171 SW 2d 282, 168 ALR 850.
[29] It is clear here that the relief to be attained in the petition for writ of mandamus, is for the Kitti Municipal Court to refrain from carrying out the provisions of its order of April 14,1987, setting forth the schedule of actions. We are asked here to order the court to desist from action or to undo its order. It is not the purpose of mandamus.
[30-31] Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which is available only in cases in which the usual forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief. Thus, in our view, a petition should show that the petitioner has exhausted all available means to obtain relief, or that there is no other means by which to obtain relief, in order forawritofmandamustoissue. Here, thepetitionerhasdone no more than what he has asked for in this case.
While no ruling is necessary, the petitioner is allowed to withdraw his petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus.
[2 P. S. Ct. R 376]
IV. Removal
After having withdrawn his petitions for writs of certiorari and mandamus, the petitioner then verbally and alternatively moved that this Court exercise its jurisdiction to remove the case presently pending in the Kitti Municipal Court to this Court. We deny the motion for the reasons below.
[32] First we reiterate that this Court has power to remove any such matter from a community court to this Court. The authority for removal of cases from community courts to the State Supreme Court is prescribed in the Pohnpei Judicial Act. S.L. 2L160-82, as amended and revised by S.L.2L-239-83 provides in Section 67,
"Transfer of Cases. Any case brought in a municipal court may be transferred by the court or by order of the Trial Division of the State Court..."
The section provides further that upon receipt of a certified copy of an order of the Trial Division of the State Court making such transfer, the municipal court in which the case is pending shall take no further action on the merits of the case, but may make orders of a temporary nature which justice may require and which are not inconsistent with the order of the Trial Division of the State Court.
[2 P. S. Ct. R 377]
[32] It is clear that two kinds of movement of cases are allowed by Section 67. The first is one made originally by a municipal court to the Trial Division of the State Court. While the statute does not provide for a procedure in such transfer, it appears to us that this is where the municipal court by its own order, certifies a matter before it to the Trial Division of the State Court. We take note in this instance, even though the statute is silent, the principle that an inferior court may not direct a superior court to act on a subject. In other words,the municipal court may not transferacase to the Trial Division of the State Court, without the consent of the Trial Division of the State Court. Section 67 is an adoption of 5TTC 403, except that for reasons unknown to us, the legislature did not speak on the principle. 5 TTC 403 does, reading,
...any case brought in a community court may be transferred by the court in which it has been brought to the trial division of the High Court or the district court having jurisdiction, with the consent of the court to which it is transferred ...."
We view that this is a procedural matter, left by the Legislature to this Court to prescribe in the application of Section 67. Accordingly we feel that the principle will apply in all transfers of cases that are instituted by the municipal courts to the State Supreme Court.
[32] The other type of movement of cased allowed by Sec-
[2 P. S. Ct. R 378]
tion 67, is where the State Supreme Court orders the Municipal Court to transfer a case to the State Supreme Court. This is the instance being sought by the petitioner in this case. Section 67 is clear in its application. Thus, we are asked here to invoke the power of this Court to remove the impeachment case of the Luhkenmoanlap from the Kitti Municipal Court to this Court.
[33-35] We note that in the United States, although the federal and state court systems are linked to the extent that in certain cases the United States Supreme Court has the power to review a decision rendered by the highest court of the state, state courts are generally independent from the federal courts. In the spirit we feel that the Pohnpei State Supreme Court will ordinarily abstain from interfering with matters of the municipal courts, unless fundamental rights guaranteed by the Pohnpei State Constitution are invaded, or enforcement of municipal laws appears otherwise repugnant to the State Constitution, laws, ortreaties of the State of Pohnpei. Even then we feel, although possessing the power to remove cases or interfere with municipal matters, that the power is not unqualified, but is to be exerted in the exercise of sound discretion. We feel that due administration of justice in the
[2 P. S. Ct. R 379]
municipal courts should not be interfered with, save in rare cases, where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist.
[36] There is no showing in this matter that circumstances existing in the impeachment proceedings before the Kitti Municipal Court up to this stage, warrant interference by this Court. We feel constrained under the circumstances to respect the doctrine of federal abstention. We note notwithstanding, in conclusion, that having thus abstained, such an abstention does not involve abdication of the jurisdiction of this Court, but only a postponement of its exercise.
Accordingly, the motion of Petitioner Luhkenmoanlap for removal of Kitti Municipal Court Civil Action No. 1-87, Isokohnedi vs. Leon Joel is denied.
This matter is hereby ordered dismissed.