P.Sared and H.Sared v. Public land Authority(1986)

POHNPEI SUPREME COURT REPORTS

VOL. 2

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PRITIANA SARED and HEINRICH SARED,

Plaintiffs

PUBLIC LANDS AUTHORITY and KANTI IPA,

Defendants

Civil Action No. 9-75

Trial Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court

December 8, 1986

Petition by defendant Kanti Ipa for an order in aid of judgment to compel defendant Public Lands Authority to comply with order of judgment entered by the Trust Territory High Court on February 11,1983. Following an order entered by the Pohnpei Supreme Court on May 31,1985, that Pohnpei Public Lands Authority make every effort to comply with paragraph 8 of the Trust Territory High Court order before December 1, 1985, or appear before the Pohnpei Supreme Court before December 1, 1985,to explain why it had not been able to comply, the Public Lands Authority filed motion on January 29,1986, for relief from judgment in part on the ground that compliance would violate the provisions of P.L. 2L-43-80. Defendant Kanti Ipa opposed the motion, among other things, on the ground that it was filed too late to satisfy the "reasonable time" requirement of Rule 53 of the Pohnpei Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Pohnpei Supreme Court, EDWEL H. SANTOS, Chief Justice, granting the motion of the Public Lands Authority, held that the Public Lands Authority's motion was filed within reasonable time; and that paragraph 8 of the judgment entered in this case by the Trust Territory High Court on February 11,1983, was a nullity and unenforceable by the Pohnpei Supreme Court.

1. Civil Procedure - Rules - Determination of Reasonable Time.

Reasonable time is such length of time as may fairly, properly and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty or the subject-matter, and to the attending circumstances (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.)

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2. Courts - Determination of Reasonable Time

It is a maxim of English Law that "how long a 'reasonable time' ought to be is not defined in law, but is left to the discretion of the judges".

3. Courts - Determination of Reasonable Time

Reasonable time is not defined in law, but is left to the discretion of judges, upon consideration of certain factors, i.e. the subject matter or the nature of the act or duty to be undertaken and the attending circumstances.

4. Civil Procedure - Rules - Determination of Reasonable Time.

The length of time a court assigns to a particular case when dealing with the issue of whether an act or duty undertaken is within a reasonable time varies. '

5. Courts - Jurisdiction.

It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court jurisdiction of a subject matter of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction.

6. Judgments - Void Judgments

A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction of a subject matter cannot be validated by consent of the parties (46 Am Jur 2d: Judgments, s. 27)

7. Civil Procedure - Rules - Determination of Reasonable Time.

Reasonable time as used in the Pohnpei Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules, particularly Rule 53 (b), must be decided on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.

8. Public Lends Authority - Powers

The Pohnpei Public Lands Act of 1980 granted limited powers to the Public Lands Authority to receive, hold and dispose of public lands pursuant to District law. (Section 10 (4), (5), (6) of D.L. 4L-69-76). .

9. Public Lands Authority - Questions Presented to Board

Where upon the stipulation of the parties the Public Lands Authority is to

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perform certain acts respecting public lands approval of such stipulation shall be by a majority of the total membership of the Board at a meeting called for the purpose at which two thirds of the total membership shall be presets (Section 8 of D.L. 4L-69-76)

10. Public Trust Lands - Distribution

Nothing in the Public Trust Lands Distribution Ad of 1980 (S.L. 2L-43-80) authorizes the Public Lands Authority to issue a deed to an individual when that individual had not followed the statutory requirement of application, to entitle him to become an eligible entryman on public lands (S.L. 2L-43-$0, Sec 3), and entry, possession and development requirement of the Act.

11. Public Trust Lands - Distribution

No Navy lease rights to approximately 3.0 hectares were created in a party where a stipulation of the parties forming the basis of a portion of a judgment could be construed as permitting a certain ad to be undertaken by the Public Lands Authority in favor of such party upon the satisfaction of an existing condition precedent of splitting equally between themselves their homestead parcel 168 containing an area of 1.5 hectares.

12. Judgments - Void Judgments

A portion of a judgment in favor of a party in rasped of rights which he does not have cannot be given effect.

13. Public Trust Lands - Homesteaders - Rights

The division of homestead parcel between homesteaders is not a taking for public purposes so as to entitle a party to compensation for losses or damages to crops, building and other improvements, or to a new homestead site. (S.L. 2L-43-80, Section 9 (1).

14. Public Trust Lands - Taking for Public Purposes

A public purpose has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political division. (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Ed.)

15. Public Trust Lands - Homesteading Program - Purposes

Where the homesteading program is viewed as a public purpose, the

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division of homestead parcel between parties could be construed as partially extinguishing their respective homestead, and the remedy for such a situation is as provided in Section 9 (1) of S.L. 21-43-80, that is, the Legislature shall by law or resolution designate the new site for replacement.

16. Public Trust Lands - Homesteads - Adverse Claims

In the instance in which more than one party shall assert adverse claims under the Public Lands Distribution Ad to land or any portion thereof, title shall issue to such persons as the State Land Commission shall determine in the interest of equity and justice (Section 4 (ti) of S.L. 2L-X13-80).

17. Judgments - Void Judgments

A judgment that is ultra vices is void.

18. Judgments - Void Judgments - Effect

Insofar as a judgment is void, it does not affect title to properly, confers no rights upon one obtaining it, and creates no liabilities upon one against whom it is rendered.

19. Judgments - Partially Void Judgments - Effect

A portion of a judgment which is in excess of power of court to grant is void, but the void portion of the judgment does not invalidate the legal portion of the judgment, and such portion may stand.

20. Judgments - Void Judgments - Effect.

Where a party files a motion for relief from judgment in part and the court holds the judgment a nullity and a party's objection to the motion as not having been filed in a reasonable time fails, other grounds for objecting to the motion, namely estoppel and prejudice must fail.

Counsel for Plaintiffs Jack Petry

At Trust Territory High Court Office of the Micronesian

Legal Services Corporation

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Counsel for Defendant Kanti Ipa Maketo Robert

At Trust Territory High Court Public Defender's Office

At Pohnpei Supreme Court Loretta Faymonville

Counsel for Defendant Public Lands Authority

At Trust Territory High Court Kris Hagerstrom

At Pohnpei Supreme Court Sungiwo Hadley.

EDWEL H. SANTOS, Chief Justice

Order of Judgment in this action was entered on February 11, 1983, by Mr. Chief Justice Alex R. Munson of the Trust Territory High Court, based on a stipulation dated February 10, 1983, and signed by attorneys Jack Petry of the Ponape Office of Micronesian Legal Services Corporation, counsel for plaintiff, Kris Hagerstrom, counsel for defendant Public Lands Authority, and Maketo Robert of the Office of the Public Defender, representing defendant Kanti Ipa.

Defendant Public Lands Authority, as successor to the Trust Territory Government in public lands, did not comply with the judgment order thus necessitating Defendant Kanti Ipa to come in on May 29, 1985, with a petition for an order in aid of judgment to compel Pohnpei Public Lands Authority to comply with the order of judgment thus entered. Following hearing on Kanti Ipa's petition,

[2 P. S. Ct. R 240]

another stipulation was entered into and signed by Loretta Faymonville of the Public Defender's Office, attorney for Kant! Ipa, and, Yasuo I. Yamada, Commissioner of Pohnpei Public Lands Authority. An order of this Court was entered on May 31, 1985, stating that:

"Pursuant to the above stipulation, it is the order of this Court that Pohnpei Public Lands Authority shall make every effort to comply with paragraph 8 of the order of judgment filed in this case on February 11,1983, before December 1, 1985, or shall appear before this Court before December 1,1985 to explain why it has not been able to comply."

On January 29, 1986, Public Lands Authority by its attorney Sungiwo Hadley filed a motion entitled "Motion for Relief from Judgment in Part. " In support of its motion, Public Lands Authority emphasizes that if it were to issue additional Navy Lease pursuant to the order of judgment entered by the High Court, the Public Lands Authority would then violate the provisions of P. L. 2L-43-80. Defendant Kanti Ipa filed opposition to Public Lands Authority's motion for relief from judgment, supported by points and authorities, and a motion to show cause. Hearing was held on April 15, 1986, and on motion of plaintiff this hearing was suspended to allow plaintiff opportunity to respond to Public Lands Authority's

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motion as she was not served with the motion. Hearing resumed on August 20,1986, and this ruling follows.

Motion for Relief from Judgment Public Lands Authority, hereinafter, PLA, grounded its motion on Rule 53 (b) (4) and (6) of the Pohnpei Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule reads as follows:

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 47 (b)

(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated instrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;

(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation:' This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an indepen-

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dent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order; or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any reef from a judgment shall be by moon as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action."

The grounds for relief assigned by PLA require that its motion be filed within a reasonable time after the entry of the judgment sought to be relieved from. The judgment in question was entered on February 11,1983. PLA's motion for relief was filed on January 29, 1986, or a period of two years, eleven months and eighteen days after the judgment was entered.

[1-2] Defendant Kanti Ipa argues that the PLA's motion was filed too late and cannot satisfy the "reasonable time" requirement of Rule 53 supra. This Court has not determined the meaning of the phrase "reasonable time" as used in Rule 53 of our rules. Accordingly it is imperative that we determine the meaning of that phrase and its application to the situation at bar. Reasonable time, according to Black's Law Dictionary 5th Ed. is such length of time as may fairly, properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty, or of the subject matter, and to the attending circumstances. "It is a maxim of English law that "how long a 'reasonable time' ought to be is not

[2 P. S. Ct. R 243]

defined in law, but is left to the discretion of the judges." Citing Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Maribury, 91 U.S. 591, 23 L Ed. 328.

[3] Under this definition we note that reasonable time is not defined in law, but is left to the discretion of judges, upon consideration of certain factors; i.e. the subject matterorthe nature of the act or duty to be undertaken and the attending circumstances. In a Chicago case decided by the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 7th Circuit, the Court held that a motion for relief filed 10 years after entry of judgment was not filed within a reasonable time. American National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Taussig, 255 F. 2d 765. The Circuit Court of Appeal said in essence, at p. 769:

"Where motion was made on June 26, 1957, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure providing that on motion and on such terms as are just court may relieve a party from final judgment, order, or proceeding, on ground that judgment is void, and that motion shall be made within a `reasonable time', to vacate and set aside final decree of June 4,1947 and supplemental decrees of October 26, 1948, December 30. 1948, June 2, 1949, October 20, 1950, May 6, 1952, and November 4, 1952, motion was not made within a `reasonable time.'

In an Idaho case, Hanson v. Rogers, 32 P. 2d 126,129, the Court held that:

"Reasonable time" within which motion may be made to vacate judgment which is not shown to be void on face of judgment roll is six months after adjournment of term at which judgment was rendered."

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[4-7] These cases illustrate the fact that the length of time a Court assigns to a particular case when dealing with the issue of whether an act or duty undertaken is within a reasonable time varies. The case at bar presents a time span of 2 years 11 months and 18 days. The judgment of the High Court of the Trust Territory in question was entered at a time in the midst of a transition period within the Federated States of Micronesia. The Pohnpei State Court was in the process of organizing, and was certified by Chief Justice Alex R. Munson of the Trust Territory High Court as a functioning State Court on February 21,1984, pursuant to Secretarial Order No. 3039. The Pohnpei Government was transforming from a District chartered government to a State constitutional government. The attorneys who where involved in. the original action and who executed the stipulation upon which the order of judgment of February 11,1983, was based were replaced by new attorneys. The Pohnpei Public Land Commissioner who was in office when the stipulation and judgment were entered was replaced by a new Commissioner. The original complaint was filed on May 2,1975, when the control over public lands was under the

[2 P. S. Ct. R 245]

Trust Territory Government, and jurisdiction over land matters was lodged in the Trust Territory High Court. State Law 2L-43-80, which came into force on November 11, 1980, technically vested the jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate all claims of right, title, or interest in public lands in the Pohnpei Land Commission. No party sought to dismiss or to transfer the case from the High Court to the Pohnpei Land Commission. It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court jurisdiction of a subject matter of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction and a judgment rendered in f such a case is not validated by the consent. 46 AM JUR 2d. Judgment, s. 27; Porter v. Potter 416 P. 2d 564. This chain of events taking place in a crucial period of transition within Pohnpei apparently precluded the Pohnpei Public Lands Authority, including the Trust Territory High Court from effectively and efficiently assessing the statutory requirement of S.L. 2L-43-80, the Public Lands Distribution Act, as well as the stipulation, which formed the basis of the judgment in question. And as discussed earlier, `a reasonable time' as used in our court Rules, particularly Rule 53 (b) must be decided on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.

Accordingly and given the facts and circumstances of the

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case at bar, f rote that PLA's motion, having been filed 2 years 11 months and 18 days under the circumstances was filed within reasonable time.

PLA's grounds for Motion for Relief:

Rule 53 (b) (4) judgment is void; and

(6) any other reason justifying seief from the operation of the judgment.

PLA argues that it would violate State Law 2L-43-80, Section 4 (3) if it were to convey more than three hectares to an entryman. Additionally PLA argues that the judgment orders PLA to convey land to both Ipa and Sared, which land the parties had not entered, developed and possessed, thus further violating Section 2 of S.L. 2L-43-80. Kant Ipa however charged, and Pritiana Sared joined in later, that PLA should be estopped from denying the validity of the agreement it had previously entered into.

In order to determine the merits of both arguments, I need to go back and take a look at the stipulation signed by the attorneys 9af all parties and the judgment entered on February 11, 1983. Paragraph 3 of the stipulation, incorporated as paragraph 3 of the

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judgment reads in part:

"3. Parcel 168, in Sekere Section, Sokehs Municipality consisting approximately 1.5 hectares, shall be split approximately equally between Pritiana Sared and Kanti Ipa with a line drawn through parcel 168. Both parries agree to allow the Court to draw the boundary line as the Court deems equitable..

Paragraph 4 incorporated in paragraph 7 of the judgment said:

"It is further stipulated that the Ponape Public Lands Authority shall forthwith cause issuance of a deed to the parties of the portion of parcel 168 as divided by the Court pursuant to its division of the land ...."

and paragraph 5 of the stipulation was incorporated in paragraph 8 of the judgment to wit:

"8. Defendant Ponape Public Lands Authority shall forth with transfer any and all Navy Lease rights that plaintiff Pritiana Sared may have in parcel 168, Sekere, Sokehs Municipality, Ponape State, to approximately 3.0 hectares of land in Sokehs Municipality, Ponape State, and upon processing an application to transfer title to Navy lease lands pursuant to. P.L. 2L-43-80, shall issue a quitclaim dead pursuant to P.L. 2L-43-80 in and to.75 hectares of said land to Kami Ipa and 2.25 hectares to Pritiana Sared; provided however, that Kanti Ipa shall have clear access to said .75 hectares and be able to plant crops thereupon."

It is this portion of the judgment and' its implementation that PLA now attacks as being illegal and void.

It has been said in other jurisdictions that, a portion of a

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judgment which is in excess of the power of the Court to grant is void, but the void portion of the judgment does not invalidate the legal portion of the judgment, and such portion may stand. Liuzza v. Bell, 104 P. 2d 1095, a California case.

The portion of the judgment, paragraph 8, which would create certain Navy lease rights in Pritiana Sared to be transferred to a new parcel in public trust land, is the main issue which PLA contends, has no legal authority.

The transfer of Trust Territory Public Lands to District Control (Secretarial Order No. 2969 of December 28,1974) resulted in the creation by the Ponape District Legislature of the Pohnpei Public Lands Authority, (D.L. 4L-69-76). The Authority is governed by a 9-member Board of Trustees.

Section 10 of the Act enumerates the powers, duties, legal capacities and characteristics of the Authority as enumerated below:

(1) to have perpetual juridical existence;

(2) to receive and hold title to public lands in trust for the people of the District;

(3) to administer, manage and regulate the usage of lands held by the Authority and income arising therefrom in trust for the people of the District

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pursuant to the provisions of this act;

(4) to establish a program for homesteading on public lands and administer such program pursuant to District law;

(5) to sell, lease, exchange, use, dedicate for public purposes, or make other disposition of such public lands pursuant to District law;

(6) to acquire lands by negotiation and purchase which are necessary or appropriate to fill the needs of the general public, as authorized by District law or resolution;

(7) to acquire lands by eminent domain as authorized by District law;

(8) to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and have other powers and duties as may be necessary or appropriate to further the purpose of this act;

(9) to negotiate in good faith, and execute binding formal agreements to meet the land requirements of the United States as may be designated under the terms of a future status agreement;

(10) to employ a Commissioner of Public Lands who shall have the following powers and duties;

(a) to direct the implementation of the policies, projects and programs of the Authority as are determined by the board;

(b) to maintain liaison among the Authority, the Legislature, the District Administration, the Traditional Leaders and others concerned with the objectives and programs of the Authority;

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(c) to maintain close communication with the Chairman of the Board as to the current status and activities of the Authority;

(d) to report to the Board at each meeting on the status of the Authority, its programs, projects, financial standing and planswid to recommend to the Board projects and programs for the Authority;

(e) to administer the staff and operations of the Authority;

(f) to employ and terminate staff personnel with the approval of the Board, and to carry out all other functions regarding Authority personnel;

(g) to exercise supervision over all Authority property and funds;

(h) to authorize all expenditures of funds under Authority control and make contrails, acceptances, purchases and sales, with Board approval for such transactions in excess of two thousand dollars, as provided in Paragraph (i) of this Subsection; and

(i) to sign contracts in amounts of two thousand dollars or less, and sign jointly with the Chairman of the Board contracts in excess of two thousand dollars;

(11) to propose legislation to the Legislature pertaining to the programs, powers and duties, of the Authority; and

(12) to establish rules and regulations, in accordance with this ad and applicable law,.for the conduct of its business and activities.

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Section 8 of the Act, which has great bearing on the stipulation of February 11, 1986, reads in pertinent part:

"...Two-thirds of the membership of the Board shall constitute a quorum to conduct the business of the Authority at meetings called for that purpose;

PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that a majority vote of the total membership of the Board shall be required for any question presented. A written record shall be kept and maintained of attendance at meetings and ail official actions taken by the Board, and a copy shall be submitted to the Legislature by the Board within ten days after each meeting."

The power granted to the PLA pursuant to the Public Lands Authority Act of 1976, supra, is limited as compared with the general power over public lands, which the Trust Territory Government possessed prior to the transfer of control of public lands was made to the Ponape District. Under the Trust Territory days, the District Administrator was empowered and authorized to execute leases and other use agreements of public lands to Trust Territory citizens, etc. subject to law or regulations approved by the High Commissioner. (67 TTC 301). The District Administrator alone could approve applications for homestead (67 TTC 205), permit to homestead (67 TTC 206), and the High Commissioner could issue

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deeds of conveyance. The stipulation as drafted (presumably by the MLSC lawyer, as the stipulation is on MLSC letter head), and signed by the attorneys of all parties would be in conformity with the Trust Territory law (67 TTC) which once governed public lands. The law governing the stipulation of February 11, 1983, is the Ponape Public Lands Authority Act of 1976 (4L-69-76), the Public Trust Lands Distribution Act of 1980, (S.L.2L-43-80), the Ponape law on lease and use agreement (4L-153-78) as amended by S: L. 2L-41-8,p.

The Ponape Public Lands Act of 1980, granted limited powers to the Authority to receive, hold and dispose of public lands pursuant to District law. (Section 10 (4),(5) (6) of 4L-69-76). Additionally, in order for the stipulation of February 11, 1983, to be approved by the Board, a two-third membership of the Board must be present in a meeting called to approve the stipulation, and a majority of the total membership shall approve the matter stipulated (Sec. 8). There is no record in the file to convince me that such procedure was followed. The Court's examination of the Public Trust Lands Distribution Act of 1980 (S.L. 2L-43-80 reveals no provision authorizing the PLA to issue a deed to an individual when

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that individual had not followed the statutory requirement of application, to entitle one to become an eligible entryman on public lands, (2L-43-80, Sec 3), and entry, possession and development requirement of the Act. While the stipulation cites S.L. 2L-43-80, and S.L. 2L-45-801, there is no provision in S.L. 2L-43-80 which would allow the PLA to undertake the act, e.g. to transfer any and all Navy lease rights that plaintiff Pritiana Sared may have in parcel 168, Sekere...to approximately 3.0 hectares in Sokehs, process ' application to transfer title, pursuant to S.L. 2L-43-80, and issue quitclaim deed pursuant to S.L. 2L-43-80. As suggested earlier, in the transitory period within which these transactions took place, the presumption is great that the parties, including the Court in 1983 may not have had ample time to conduct an in-depth research in order to reconcile the difference in the Trust Territory and Ponape statutes dealing with public trust lands. Hence, there is a strong inference here that the parties to the stipulation might have committed this error through oversight and haste.

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[11-12) On the other hand, this portion of the judgment could be construed as permitting a certain act to be undertaken by the Pt.A in favor of Piliana Sared and Kanti Ipa if and only if a condition precedent exists and is satisfied. The condition precedent is that in homesteading parcel 168 containing an area of 1.5 hectares in Sekere by Pritiana Sared and Kanti I pa and in splitting the parcel equally between them there is created certain Navy lease rights in Pritiana Sared. I rule that such rights were not created and this portion of the judgment can not be given effect. "No rights in or to a homestead permit granted under the provisions of this Chapter shall be. sold, assigned, leased, transferred or encumbered ...."

(67 TTC-209).

Under S.L. 2L-43-80, the rights conferred upon a homesteader are enumerated in Section 9, et. seq.

[13] Subsection (1) of Section 9 is relevant to this case and reads as follows:

"A homesteader whose homestead site, or any portion thereof shall be taken for public purposes shall be entitled to compensation for losses of or any damages to crops, building, and other improvements. In the instance the taking shall be such as to extinguish the homestead, the homesteader shall be given a new homestead site in an area designated by law or resolution of the Legislature for such purpose."

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The division of parcel 168 between Pritiana Sared and Kanti Ipa was not a taking for public purposes. A public purpose ...has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political division. (Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition).

On the other hand, if the homesteading program should be viewed as a public purpose, the division of parcel 168 in Sekere between Pritiana Sared and Kanti Ipa could be construed as partially extinguishing their respective homesteads, and the remedy for such situation is as provided under Section 9 (1) supra, that is, the Legislature shall by law or resolution designate the new site for replacement. No law or resolution was passed by the Legislature relative to this matter. All in all, I think Section 4 (6) of S.L.2L-43-80 is the controlling section. That section reads:

"(6) In the instance in which more than one party shall assert adverse claims under this Act to land or any portion thereof, title shall issue to such persons as the State Land Commission shall determine in the interest of equity and justice. Receipt of title to public land under this Ad is a privilege accorded to qualifying beneficiary of the Public Land Trust of this State. . ."

Paragraph 8 of the, High Court Judgment, thus is ultra vires

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and is void. In a Utah case, the Court said of a void judgment:

"Insofar as judgment is void, it does not affect title to property, confers no rights upon one obtaining it, and creates no liabilities upon one against whom it is rendered." Farley v. Farley, 431, P. 2d 133;

and in a California case cited supra, the Court said of a judgment that is partially invalid thusly,

"A portion of judgment which is in excess of power of Court to grant is void, but the void portion of the judgment does not invalidate the legal portion of the judgment, and such portion may stand." Liuzzua v. Bell 104 P. 2d 1095.

In view of the foregoing discussion Pritiana Sared and Kanti Ipa's other grounds for objecting PLA's motion, namely, estoppel and prejudice must fail. I hold therefore that paragraph 8 of the judgment entered in this case by the Trust Territory High Court on February 11, 1983, is a nullity and can not be given effect by this Court. It appears, however, during the hearing that the PLA has not complied with the issuance of deeds pursuant to paragraph 7 of said judgment. The PLA should issue the deeds re: parcel 168 in Sekere pursuant to the judgment of the High Court.

Accordingly, Ponape Public Lands Authority's motion for relief from judgment in part is granted, and if the PLA has not yet

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issued deeds to Pritiana Sared and Kanti Ipa pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7 of the judgment heretofore entered in this matter, it is the ORDER of this Court that the Pohnpei Public Lands Authority comply with that portion of the judgment within the next 120 days after receipt of a copy of this Ruling.

[footnotes]

1. 2L-45-80 cited in paragraph 5 of the stipulation deals with an appropriation of fund, not related to public lands. This is an example of this case being done with haste; and haste made waste. ''