J.Kimoto v.K.Kimoto(1986)

POHNPEI SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2 P. S. Ct. R 22]

Pohnpei Civil Action No. 240-85

Trial Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court

Motion by the petitioner for an order in aid of judgment, compelling the Pohnpei Department of Finance to allot alimony and child support payments from the payroll check of the respondent; and motion by the respondent to terminate alimony payments on the ground that an agreement for property distribution, alimony and support made between the parties was entered into by the respondent as the result either of undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the petitioner, or betrayal of confidence reposed in the petitioner by the respondent.

The Pohnpei Supreme Court, EDWEL H. SANTOS, Chief Justice, held (1) that 8 TTC 55 provided the statutory authority to the Court to act on a motion for an order in aid of judgment and the object of that provision was to determine the judgment debtor's ability to make payment as ordered in the Court judgment; (2) that the judgment debtor, the respondent herein, was capable of making the payment as ordered in the divorce proceeding heretofore entered; (3) that to conform with Pohnpeian concept of justice and to maintain a reasonable degree of respect toward each other it was appropriate that the respondent took the initiative in requesting and authorizing the Department of Finance to make the necessary allotment from the respondent's payroll check, and if the Finance Department shall refuse to act, then a Court Order might issue; (4) that there being nothing in the evidence to suggest that the respondent was threatened in any way to accept the terms of the agreement, nor that he suggested certain terms which were not included in the agreement which could amount to a betrayal of confidence, and that the respondent did not want the services of counsel in order to save counsel fee, the Court's conclusion was that the agreement executed by the parties was not the result of undue influence, fraud, or misrepresentation, nor was there confidence betrayed; and (5) that with the change in the financial circumstances of the parties since the entry of the decree of divorce, modification of the amount of alimony rather than termination of the alimony, was equitable and proper.

[2 P. S. Ct. R 23]

1. Statutes - Construction - Object

2. Jurisprudence - Pohnpeian Concept of Justice

3. Contracts - Vitiating Factors - Effect

4. Contracts - Agreement for Property Distribution, Alimony and Support.

5. Domestic Relations - Divorce - Decree as to Custody or Support of Minor Children or of the Parties - Revision.

6. Domestic Relations - Order to Pay Alimony - Modification.

[2 P. S. Ct. R 24]

7. Jurisprudence - Pohnpeian Concept of Justice.

Counsel for Petitioner Fredrick Ramp, Esq.

Counsel for Respondent Michael J. Berman, Esq.

Edwel H. Santos, Chief Justice

Following entry of Decree of Divorce on November 15,1985, two post trial motions were filed in this action. The first motion was a motion for an order in aid of judgment filed on December 3,1985, by the petitioner. The second motion was a motion to terminate alimony payments filed on December 16,1985, by the respondent. I discuss and rule on the two motions respectively as follows:

1. Petitioner's Motion for an Order in Aid of Judgment.

This motion seeks the Court to enter an Order compelling the Pohnpei Department of Finance to allot alimony and child support payments ordered in the Court's Decree of Divorce, supra, from the payroll check of the respondent.

Hearing on the motion was held on December 17,1985, with both parties present. I find on the basis of the evidence that

(1) The respondent is a prime contract employee of the Pohnpei government and receives an annual net salary of $ 37,000,

[2 P. S. Ct. R 25]

or a fortnightly net salary of $1,423.97. The respondent's current employment contract commenced July 1,1985 and ends June 30, 1987.

(2) Since the execution of the parties' October 24, 1985 agreement entitled "Agreement for Property Distribution, Alimony and Support. ,

The respondent had made the following payments:

$100.00 on October 25, 1985

$200.00 on November 7, 1985

$400.00 on November 20, 1985

$400.00 on December 1985.

Making a total of $1,100.00.

The divorce decree requires that as of December 17, 1985, the respondent would have made four fortnightly payments of $640 each or a total of $2,560. The amount thus reported paid to petitioner by the respondent as above indicates is $1,460 short. [1 ] 8 TTC 55 provides the statutory authority to act on a motion for an order in aid of judgment. The object of this Code provision however is to determine the judgment debtor's ability to make payment as ordered in the Court judgment. I find the judgment

[2 P. S. Ct. R 26]

debtor, the respondent herein, capable of making the payment as ordered in the divorce decree heretofore entered.

The motion however seeks an order to compel the Pohnpei Department of Finance to make the allotment from the respondent's payroll check to satisfy the alimony and child support payment. There is no showing that the respondent had requested and the Finance Department had refused to make such allotment from the respondent's payroll check.

The Department of Finance has a standing policy which authorizes an employee to make a request on TT-Form 575. Application and Authorization to Make or Discontinue Allotment From Pay Of Civil Employees, from which the Department of Finance will proceed in making the requested and authorized allotment from the employee's payroll check.

[2] To conform with Pohnpeian concept of justice and to maintain a reasonable degree of respect toward each other, I feel it is appropriate that the respondent takes the initiative in requesting and authorizing the Department of Finance to make the necessary allotment from the respondent's payroll check, and if the Finance Department shall refuse to act, then a court order may

[2 P. S. Ct. R 27]

2. Respondent's Motion to Terminate Alimony Payments

On December 16, 1985, the respondent filed his motion to termi

nate alimony payments. Said motion is grounded as follows:

(1) The respondent did not have the benefit of counsel at any time during the divorce proceeding.

(2) The settlement agreement signed by the parties was pre pared by counsel for the petitioner.

(3) The respondent trusted the petitioner to treat him fairly because of the confidential relationship that he thought existed up until the entry of the decree of divorce.

(4) The award of permanent alimony should be awarded when a spouse can show special and unique circumstances, none of which are present in this case.

(5) The award of rehabilitative alimony should be awarded so as to assist the spouse to become self-supporting, and such award should be limited in duration. No such need exists in this case.

(6) The petitioner should not be awarded either permanent or rehabilitative alimony based on an evaluation of the following

[2 P. S. Ct. R 28]

factors, all of which weigh against the petitioner:

(a) Financial resources of the petitioner;

(b) Length of marriage;

(d) Relative earning capacity of the petitioner; and

(e) Contribution to the marriage by the petitioner.

The petitioner opposed this motion and hearing was held on January 17, 1986.

The Respondent's grounds for his motion may be summarized in one basic issue as follows:

(1) Whether the making of the "Agreement for Property Distribution, Alimony and Support" hereinafter "Agreement", was the result of undue influence, fraud, or misrepresentation on the part of the petitioner, or whether confidence reposed in the petitioner by the respondent was betrayed.

In discussing the issue here some background information is proper.

The parties were united in marriage by the Presiding District Court Judge Carl Kohler on September 18, 1981, in Kolonia, Ponape. They had been married for a little over four (4) years prior

[2 P. S. Ct. R 29]

to their decision to enter into an agreement for a divorce and the entry of the decree of divorce dissolving the marriage between the parties. During the marriage the parties along with their two minor dependents were making their livelihood principally from the respondent's salary.

The respondent argued the grounds for his motion and introduced in evidence his monthly financial expenses as follows:

Transportation 250 (estimated cost of buying a $6,000 vehicle and payments to cover a 2 year period)

Vacation 167 ($2,000 divided by 12)

Contribution 300 (to daughter by previous marriage)

Sundries, Tobacco &Incidentals--50

Food 350-400 (Average $375)

Bank of Hawaii 210 (18 payments owed)

Bank of Guam---- 200 (4 payments owed)

Other bill - 33 ($400 in medical bills, paid over 12 month period).

Monthly Expenditures- 2,561

Gross Income 37,000 per annum, ($3,083 Monthly)

Nett Income - 2,574 per month.

In opposition the petitioner argues that the Agreement of the

[2 P. S. Ct. R 30]

parties which was incorporated in the decree of divorce was freely entered into, without undue influence, and was a negotiated arms length arrangement between the petitioner and the respondent and is binding upon them; and that the financial conditions of the parties were not changed subsequent to the entry of the decree of divorce to even warrant modification of the decree.

Evidence shows that prior to April 1985, the respondent had made three trips to Guam; one trip in mid-October, and one in December. These trips were combined official and personal trips which lasted approximately two weeks each. Apparently the petitioner was not too happy about these trips, but in order to maintain the dignity and to preserve the reputation of the parties, the decision to te I terminate their marriage "in an amicable and dignified manner, voiding contentions," was arrived at.

The making of the October 24,1985 Agreement.

[3] It should be noted at the outset that the Agreement contains several terms, and I the only term now under attack by the respondent is the term dealing with alimony. If the Agreement was a product of undue influence, fraud, or misrepresentation, the entire Agreement may be stricken down if repudiated.

[2 P. S. Ct. R 31]

Nevertheless, it is clear from the evidence that in negotiating the Agreement the petitioner proposed certain terms to be included in the Agreement, and the respondent accepted some and rejected two of the terms offered. Those terms accepted were put in writing by the petitioner's attorney and after review and explanation made to the parties, the parties executed the Agreement as binding upon them.

The respondent testified that he was under pressure, bills coming in, power breakdown, divorce impending. I can appreciate these factors as causing the respondent to be quite careless in accepting the offer of the petitioner, under the circumstances, just to get the matter over with. [4] I find nothing in the evidence however to suggest that the respondent was threatened in any way to accept the terms of the Agreement, nor that he suggested certain terms which were not included in the Agreement which could amount to a betrayal of confidence. The remaining factor is the fact that the respondent was not represented by counsel. However there was explanation given that he did not want the services of counsel in order to save counsel fee. For these reasons to conclude that the

[2 P. S. Ct. R 32]

Agreement executed by the parties was not the result of undue influence, fraud, or misrepresentation, nor was there confidence betrayed.

[5] I now turn to the equity of the matter. 39 TTC 103 says in part:

". . . A decree as to custody or support of minor children or of the parties shall be subject to revision by the court at any time upon motion of either party and such notice, if any, as the court deems justice requires."

The petitioner introduced in evidence Exhibit 1 showing her monthly expenses incurred since her divorce from the respondent as follows:

Food and baby support items- 550

[2 P. S. Ct. R 33]

Entertainment & Misc. -- 50

Petitioner's Total Monthly Expenditures $1,498

She is employed at the Palm Terrace and receives $367 fortnightly or a monthly earning of $795.00 (367 x 26 pps x 12). When the decree of divorce was entered, there was no mention of the petitioner being employed and receiving wages of $795 per month, nor was that amount of income considered in the amount of alimony decreed.

[6] The respondent since the entry of the decree of divorce has remarried and thus has a new dependant to feed and to maintain. I hold therefore that the financial circumstances of the parties have changed, and that modification of the amount of alimony, rather than termination of the alimony, is equitable and proper here. The respondent brought the petitioner from far away land to this island and the two lived on this island for over four years. Under the Pohnpeian concept of justice, it is unfair and inhuman to bring a person from a different land to a strange area and leave him/her there without any means of support. The question is how much support is necessary. The evidence shows that the petitioner's monthly expenses amounts to $1,498, she receives a monthly

[2 P. S. Ct. R 34]

salary of $795. I conclude that $300.00 fortnightly payment of alimony will be sufficient to meet the petitioner's needs. While this figure when added to her other incomes is less than her reported monthly expenditures, the Court encourages the petitioner to adjust her expenses to avoid too much hardship. The payment of alimony as modified here is due and payable to the petitioner on a fortnightly basis and to continue through June 30,1987, or until the petitioner remarries, whichever first occurs.

Accordingly it is Ordered as follows:

1. In relation to the petitioner's motion for an order in aid of judgment,

(a) The respondent, Kiyoshi Kimoto, is hereby ordered to file a request and authorization on TT-Form 575 or by any appropriate means with the Pohnpei Department of Finance authorizing said Department to make an allotment of $513 from the respondent's fortnightly payroll check, said sum to be payable to the order of the petitioner, Joanne Kimoto, to be distributed as to $213 for child support and $300 for alimony.

[2 P. S. Ct. R 35]

(b) The allotment under paragraph (a) above shaft continue through June 30,1987, or until the petitioner remarries, whichever first occurs.

2. In relation to the respondent's motion to terminate the alimony.

(a) The payment of alimony as heretofore decreed is hereby modified and is reduced from $427 to $300 fortnightly, said modification and reduction to become effective on the first pay period following the entry of the Order

(b) Except for the modification and reduction of the alimony above, the other terms of the Decree of Divorce entered November 15, 1985, are to be complied with.

So Ordered this 8th day of February, 1986.


	POHNPEI SUPREME COURT REPORTS VOL. 2 [2 P. S. Ct. R 22] JOANNE KIMOTO, Petitioner v. KIYOSHI KIMOTO, Respondent Pohnpei Civil Action No. 240-85 Trial Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court February 8, 1986 Motion by the petitioner for an order in aid of judgment, compelling the Pohnpei Department of Finance to allot alimony and child support payments from the payroll check of the respondent; and motion by the respondent to terminate alimony payments on the ground that an agreement for property distribution, alimony and support made between the parties was entered into by the respondent as the result either of undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the petitioner, or betrayal of confidence reposed in the petitioner by the respondent. The Pohnpei Supreme Court, EDWEL H. SANTOS, Chief Justice, held (1) that 8 TTC 55 provided the statutory authority to the Court to act on a motion for an order in aid of judgment and the object of that provision was to determine the judgment debtor's ability to make payment as ordered in the Court judgment; (2) that the judgment debtor, the respondent herein, was capable of making the payment as ordered in the divorce proceeding heretofore entered; (3) that to conform with Pohnpeian concept of justice and to maintain a reasonable degree of respect toward each other it was appropriate that the respondent took the initiative in requesting and authorizing the Department of Finance to make the necessary allotment from the respondent's payroll check, and if the Finance Department shall refuse to act, then a Court Order might issue; (4) that there being nothing in the evidence to suggest that the respondent was threatened in any way to accept the terms of the agreement, nor that he suggested certain terms which were not included in the agreement which could amount to a betrayal of confidence, and that the respondent did not want the services of counsel in order to save counsel fee, the Court's conclusion was that the agreement executed by the parties was not the result of undue influence, fraud, or misrepresentation, nor was there confidence betrayed; and (5) that with the change in the financial circumstances of the parties since the entry of the decree of divorce, modification of the amount of alimony rather than termination of the alimony, was equitable and proper. [2 P. S. Ct. R 23] 1. Statutes - Construction - Object Title 8 TTC 55 provides statutory authority to the Court to ad on a motion for an order in aid of judgment and the object of this Code provision is to determine the judgment debtor's ability to make payment as ordered in the court judgment. 2. Jurisprudence - Pohnpeian Concept of Justice To conform with Pohnpeian concept of justice and to maintain a reasonable degree of respect toward divorced spouses the Court feels it appropriate that the respondent takes the initiative in requesting and authorizing the Department of Finance to make the necessary allotment from his payroll check toward the payment of alimony and child support, and if the Finance Department shall refuse to act, then a Court Order may issue. 3. Contracts - Vitiating Factors - Effect An agreement which is the product of undue influence, fraud, or misrepresentation may be striken down entirely If repudiated. 4. Contracts - Agreement for Property Distribution, Alimony and Support. Where respondent was not represented by counsel when agreement for property distribution, alimony and support was signed and the explanation was given that he did not want the services of counsel in order to save counsel fee, in the absence of undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation or a betrayal of confidence by the petitioner, the agreement is enforceable. 5. Domestic Relations - Divorce - Decree as to Custody or Support of Minor Children or of the Parties - Revision. A decree as to custody or support of minor children or of the parties shall be subject to revision by the Court at any time upon motion of either party and such notice, if any, as the court deems justice requires (39 TTC 103). 6. Domestic Relations - Order to Pay Alimony - Modification. Where the financial circumstances of the parties have changed a modification of the amount of alimony, rather than termination of the alimony may be ordered by the Court if it is equitable and proper, as here [2 P. S. Ct. R 24] 7. Jurisprudence - Pohnpeian Concept of Justice. Under Pohnpeian concept of justice, it is unfair and inhuman to bring a person from a different land to a strange area and leave him/her there without any means of support. Counsel for Petitioner Fredrick Ramp, Esq. Counsel for Respondent Michael J. Berman, Esq. Edwel H. Santos, Chief Justice Following entry of Decree of Divorce on November 15,1985, two post trial motions were filed in this action. The first motion was a motion for an order in aid of judgment filed on December 3,1985, by the petitioner. The second motion was a motion to terminate alimony payments filed on December 16,1985, by the respondent. I discuss and rule on the two motions respectively as follows: 1. Petitioner's Motion for an Order in Aid of Judgment. This motion seeks the Court to enter an Order compelling the Pohnpei Department of Finance to allot alimony and child support payments ordered in the Court's Decree of Divorce, supra, from the payroll check of the respondent. Hearing on the motion was held on December 17,1985, with both parties present. I find on the basis of the evidence that (1) The respondent is a prime contract employee of the Pohnpei government and receives an annual net salary of $ 37,000, [2 P. S. Ct. R 25] or a fortnightly net salary of $1,423.97. The respondent's current employment contract commenced July 1,1985 and ends June 30, 1987. (2) Since the execution of the parties' October 24, 1985 agreement entitled "Agreement for Property Distribution, Alimony and Support. , The respondent had made the following payments: $100.00 on October 25, 1985 $200.00 on November 7, 1985 $400.00 on November 20, 1985 $400.00 on December 1985. Making a total of $1,100.00. The divorce decree requires that as of December 17, 1985, the respondent would have made four fortnightly payments of $640 each or a total of $2,560. The amount thus reported paid to petitioner by the respondent as above indicates is $1,460 short. [1 ] 8 TTC 55 provides the statutory authority to act on a motion for an order in aid of judgment. The object of this Code provision however is to determine the judgment debtor's ability to make payment as ordered in the Court judgment. I find the judgment [2 P. S. Ct. R 26] debtor, the respondent herein, capable of making the payment as ordered in the divorce decree heretofore entered. The motion however seeks an order to compel the Pohnpei Department of Finance to make the allotment from the respondent's payroll check to satisfy the alimony and child support payment. There is no showing that the respondent had requested and the Finance Department had refused to make such allotment from the respondent's payroll check. The Department of Finance has a standing policy which authorizes an employee to make a request on TT-Form 575. Application and Authorization to Make or Discontinue Allotment From Pay Of Civil Employees, from which the Department of Finance will proceed in making the requested and authorized allotment from the employee's payroll check. [2] To conform with Pohnpeian concept of justice and to maintain a reasonable degree of respect toward each other, I feel it is appropriate that the respondent takes the initiative in requesting and authorizing the Department of Finance to make the necessary allotment from the respondent's payroll check, and if the Finance Department shall refuse to act, then a court order may [2 P. S. Ct. R 27] issue. 2. Respondent's Motion to Terminate Alimony Payments On December 16, 1985, the respondent filed his motion to termi nate alimony payments. Said motion is grounded as follows: (1) The respondent did not have the benefit of counsel at any time during the divorce proceeding. (2) The settlement agreement signed by the parties was pre pared by counsel for the petitioner. (3) The respondent trusted the petitioner to treat him fairly because of the confidential relationship that he thought existed up until the entry of the decree of divorce. (4) The award of permanent alimony should be awarded when a spouse can show special and unique circumstances, none of which are present in this case. (5) The award of rehabilitative alimony should be awarded so as to assist the spouse to become self-supporting, and such award should be limited in duration. No such need exists in this case. (6) The petitioner should not be awarded either permanent or rehabilitative alimony based on an evaluation of the following [2 P. S. Ct. R 28] factors, all of which weigh against the petitioner: (a) Financial resources of the petitioner; (b) Length of marriage; (c) Age, health and physical condition of petitioner; (d) Relative earning capacity of the petitioner; and (e) Contribution to the marriage by the petitioner. The petitioner opposed this motion and hearing was held on January 17, 1986. The Respondent's grounds for his motion may be summarized in one basic issue as follows: (1) Whether the making of the "Agreement for Property Distribution, Alimony and Support" hereinafter "Agreement", was the result of undue influence, fraud, or misrepresentation on the part of the petitioner, or whether confidence reposed in the petitioner by the respondent was betrayed. In discussing the issue here some background information is proper. The parties were united in marriage by the Presiding District Court Judge Carl Kohler on September 18, 1981, in Kolonia, Ponape. They had been married for a little over four (4) years prior [2 P. S. Ct. R 29] to their decision to enter into an agreement for a divorce and the entry of the decree of divorce dissolving the marriage between the parties. During the marriage the parties along with their two minor dependents were making their livelihood principally from the respondent's salary. The respondent argued the grounds for his motion and introduced in evidence his monthly financial expenses as follows: Housing $ 150 Utilities 75 Transportation 250 (estimated cost of buying a $6,000 vehicle and payments to cover a 2 year period) POL 50 Clothing 10 Vacation 167 ($2,000 divided by 12) Contribution 300 (to daughter by previous marriage) Life Insurance 26 Sundries, Tobacco &Incidentals--50 Health Insurance 25 Food 350-400 (Average $375) Bank of Hawaii 210 (18 payments owed) Bank of Guam---- 200 (4 payments owed) Personal note Alimony 854 Child Support- 213 Other bill - 33 ($400 in medical bills, paid over 12 month period). Monthly Expenditures- 2,561 Gross Income 37,000 per annum, ($3,083 Monthly) Nett Income - 2,574 per month. In opposition the petitioner argues that the Agreement of the [2 P. S. Ct. R 30] parties which was incorporated in the decree of divorce was freely entered into, without undue influence, and was a negotiated arms length arrangement between the petitioner and the respondent and is binding upon them; and that the financial conditions of the parties were not changed subsequent to the entry of the decree of divorce to even warrant modification of the decree. Evidence shows that prior to April 1985, the respondent had made three trips to Guam; one trip in mid-October, and one in December. These trips were combined official and personal trips which lasted approximately two weeks each. Apparently the petitioner was not too happy about these trips, but in order to maintain the dignity and to preserve the reputation of the parties, the decision to te I terminate their marriage "in an amicable and dignified manner, voiding contentions," was arrived at. The making of the October 24,1985 Agreement. [3] It should be noted at the outset that the Agreement contains several terms, and I the only term now under attack by the respondent is the term dealing with alimony. If the Agreement was a product of undue influence, fraud, or misrepresentation, the entire Agreement may be stricken down if repudiated. [2 P. S. Ct. R 31] Nevertheless, it is clear from the evidence that in negotiating the Agreement the petitioner proposed certain terms to be included in the Agreement, and the respondent accepted some and rejected two of the terms offered. Those terms accepted were put in writing by the petitioner's attorney and after review and explanation made to the parties, the parties executed the Agreement as binding upon them. The respondent testified that he was under pressure, bills coming in, power breakdown, divorce impending. I can appreciate these factors as causing the respondent to be quite careless in accepting the offer of the petitioner, under the circumstances, just to get the matter over with. [4] I find nothing in the evidence however to suggest that the respondent was threatened in any way to accept the terms of the Agreement, nor that he suggested certain terms which were not included in the Agreement which could amount to a betrayal of confidence. The remaining factor is the fact that the respondent was not represented by counsel. However there was explanation given that he did not want the services of counsel in order to save counsel fee. For these reasons to conclude that the [2 P. S. Ct. R 32] Agreement executed by the parties was not the result of undue influence, fraud, or misrepresentation, nor was there confidence betrayed. [5] I now turn to the equity of the matter. 39 TTC 103 says in part: ". . . A decree as to custody or support of minor children or of the parties shall be subject to revision by the court at any time upon motion of either party and such notice, if any, as the court deems justice requires." The petitioner introduced in evidence Exhibit 1 showing her monthly expenses incurred since her divorce from the respondent as follows: Rent $ 250 Utilities 73 Water 5 Baby-sitter 200 Laundry 55 Auto maintenance 50 Auto Insurance 50 Gasoline 40 Food and baby support items- 550 Clothing -- 100 Medical Expenses 75 [2 P. S. Ct. R 33] Entertainment & Misc. -- 50 Petitioner's Total Monthly Expenditures $1,498 She is employed at the Palm Terrace and receives $367 fortnightly or a monthly earning of $795.00 (367 x 26 pps x 12). When the decree of divorce was entered, there was no mention of the petitioner being employed and receiving wages of $795 per month, nor was that amount of income considered in the amount of alimony decreed. [6] The respondent since the entry of the decree of divorce has remarried and thus has a new dependant to feed and to maintain. I hold therefore that the financial circumstances of the parties have changed, and that modification of the amount of alimony, rather than termination of the alimony, is equitable and proper here. The respondent brought the petitioner from far away land to this island and the two lived on this island for over four years. Under the Pohnpeian concept of justice, it is unfair and inhuman to bring a person from a different land to a strange area and leave him/her there without any means of support. The question is how much support is necessary. The evidence shows that the petitioner's monthly expenses amounts to $1,498, she receives a monthly [2 P. S. Ct. R 34] salary of $795. I conclude that $300.00 fortnightly payment of alimony will be sufficient to meet the petitioner's needs. While this figure when added to her other incomes is less than her reported monthly expenditures, the Court encourages the petitioner to adjust her expenses to avoid too much hardship. The payment of alimony as modified here is due and payable to the petitioner on a fortnightly basis and to continue through June 30,1987, or until the petitioner remarries, whichever first occurs. Accordingly it is Ordered as follows: 1. In relation to the petitioner's motion for an order in aid of judgment, (a) The respondent, Kiyoshi Kimoto, is hereby ordered to file a request and authorization on TT-Form 575 or by any appropriate means with the Pohnpei Department of Finance authorizing said Department to make an allotment of $513 from the respondent's fortnightly payroll check, said sum to be payable to the order of the petitioner, Joanne Kimoto, to be distributed as to $213 for child support and $300 for alimony. [2 P. S. Ct. R 35] (b) The allotment under paragraph (a) above shaft continue through June 30,1987, or until the petitioner remarries, whichever first occurs. 2. In relation to the respondent's motion to terminate the alimony. (a) The payment of alimony as heretofore decreed is hereby modified and is reduced from $427 to $300 fortnightly, said modification and reduction to become effective on the first pay period following the entry of the Order (b) Except for the modification and reduction of the alimony above, the other terms of the Decree of Divorce entered November 15, 1985, are to be complied with. So Ordered this 8th day of February, 1986.