Pohnpei v. Route

Prosecution on three counts for criminal offenses. Count I charged the defendant for violation of the Pohnpei State Vehicle Code, Chapter 8 Section 805, driving while under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. Count II charged him for violating Chapter 4, Section 429 of the Code by exceeding the speed limit of 25 mph on the highway, and Count III charged him for violating Chapter 8 Section 803 (1) of the Code, for fleeing from police officer.

intoxicating liquor" in the statute "if intoxicating liquor has affected the nervous system, brain or muscle of the driver of an automobile as to impair to an appreciable degree, his ability to operate his car in a manner that an ordinary, prudent and cautious man in full possession of his faculties, using reasonable care, would operate or drive a similar vehicle under like conditions, then such driver is "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" within the meaning of the statute; (2) that the guilt of the defendant on the over speeding charge was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, and (3) that though the prosecution established the corpus delicti and the Court was convinced the defendant committed the crime of fleeing from the police officers, the testimony showed that he had no intention to flee but was in fear of imminent bodily harm, and under the circumstances, his act was excusable.

Held before me on September 4, 1985, at Kolonia, Pohnpei State. It was stipulated that this case will be decided on the basis of evidence brought in the trial of Pohnpei Criminal Case No. 273-85, State vs. Route, for the reason that charges made in this case stem from the same incident that gives rise to Criminal Case

The accused and six other companion boys came to Kolonia from Kitti on March 17, 1985, to visit. Before they returned to Kitti, they bought for themselves some alcohol: a bottle of vodka and a bottle of bacardi. On their way to Kitti, they stopped at the school playground in Palikir and began to drink the bottle of vodka. Before they finished the vodka, they went on their way. The accused had some drink of the vodka.

At Paies, they got into a fight with a police officer who stopped them to investigate their consumption and possession of alcoholic beverage on their vehicle. The fight ended with the injury of a Solpisio Salvador. The accused has been convicted for the injury of Salvador (Pohnpei Criminal Case No. 273-85.)

After the injury of Salvador, the boys boarded their truck and ran to Kitti. On the way, somewhere between Paies and Dien, Officer Robi passed the boys' truck and proceeded to the home of Officer Ruben Tom, which was near the road in Dien. Officer Robi stopped at Ruben Tom's home and sought police assistance to

The accused was the driver of the boys' truck. When they passed by Ruben Tom's residence, he saw officer Robi's car parked at the residence, and knew that Ruben Tom, a grand-uncle of the accused, a police officer, was going to engage in the arrest, which officer Robi had attempted unsuccessfully at Paies. He assumed correctly, for Officer Tom joined the force and pursued the boys' truck, with Tom in command.

[1] SL-2L-132-82 does not define what is meant by the term "under the influence of intoxicating liquor." I feel it is for the Court to give an instruction defining this term, to provide some conception and understanding of what is generally considered by law as being "under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Without it being defined, one may construe it to mean that a party must be "drunk", another that he be "completely out and devoid of reason," another may construe it to mean that if it is proven that he has taken one drink he is"under the influence of intoxicating liquor." For this reason I believe it is best that this Court define the term, so that it is clear what the law of this State considers as one being "under the influence of intoxicating liquor."

It is a well known fact that intoxicating liquor has a different effect upon the system of different parties. Some persons may drink a quantity of liquor, and still be in their normal senses, others with a very limited quantity will be completely out. Some people are not so affected by the drinking of beer, others become completely drunk by the drinking of the same. These are fundamental questions to be determined by the trier of facts, under proper evidence, to meet the issues of each case to arrive at a proper verdict.

Statutes relating to the act of driving while intoxicated are not uniform in the terms employed in reference to the particular condition of the driver which is required to bring the act within the terms of the statute which proscribes the offense. One form of statute proscribes the offense in terms of driving "while under the influence of intoxicating liquor". Another proscribes it in terms of driving "while in an intoxicated condition", and still another in terms of driving "while intoxicated or in any degree under the influence of intoxicating liquor."

It has been generally held that the phrases "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" and "in an intoxicated condition are synonymous. Moral v. Wyoming Highway Department, 203 P2d 954. There is authority, however, that while all persons intoxicated are "under the influence of intoxicating liquor", the reverse is not true. Shorter v. State, 52 ALR 2d 1329. There is a distinction between drunkenness and being under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and it is not necessary to prove drunkenness to secure a conviction under a statute prohibiting the operation of motor vehicles while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, nor is it necessary to prove any specific degree of intoxication. Shorter v. State, supra. With regard to the offense of driving while under the

influence of intoxicating liquor, it has been held in several jurisdictions that even the slightest degree of intoxication is sufficient to support a conviction, and that intoxication need not be of such a degree that it interferes with the proper operation of a motor vehicle. See State v. Duguid, 72 P2d 435 and Harrell v. Norfolk, 42 ALR 550.

Other courts have held however, that to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor within the meaning of such a statute, an accused must have been rendered incapable of operating a motor vehicle in a manner in which an ordinary prudent and cautious person in full possession of his faculties, using reasonable care, would operate a similar machine under like conditions. See People v. Dingle 205 P 705; Luellen v. State, 81 P2d 323.

[2-3] The gist of the crime as enumerated in Article VIII, Section 805 of S.L. 2L-132-82 is, "under the influence of intoxicating liquor." From the reading of this section, it appears evidently, that it is not the intent of the framers of this law, to fasten guilt in the case of any and every "influence", due to the use of intoxicating liquor, however slight. It was enacted to protect the public from those who, while under influence of intoxicating liquor, attempt to operate an automobile upon the highway of this State, especially

[4-7] The law should be liberally construed so as to effect its purpose, and bring safety to those who drive on the public highway in an orderly and lawful manner. The Court takes cognizance of the fact that there are increasing cases in the State of Pohnpei that arise under this statute, which include the danger from drunken driving, and I have searched the books for what I believe to be a fair definition of the words "under the influence of intoxicating liquor". I conclude that the phrase that follows "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" in Section 8 should be the measuring instrument in determining the extent or condition of intoxication that constitutes "under influence of intoxicating liquor" under which, to operate a motor vehicle would be an offense. This phrase is, "to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving." One may be "under influence" but to a degree in which he is still capable of safely driving. Clearly, that is not what the framers intend to outlaw. The law intends to protect careful and safe drivers, too. The degree must be at an extent where the person is "incapable"of safely driving. I think I will be well within the bounds of accuracy in defining the phrase by saying that, "if intoxicating liquor has far affected the nervous system, brain or muscles of the driver of an automobile as

to impair to an appreciable degree, his ability to operate his car in a manner that an ordinary, prudent and cautious man in full possession of his faculties, using reasonable care, would operate or drive a similar vehicle under like conditions," then such driver is "under the influence of intoxicating liquor", within the meaning of -the statute.

In the case at bar, I find no evidence which establishes that the accused, as a result of his sharing in the drinking of the intoxicating vodka, was influenced to the degree discussed above, when he drove his company's car from Paies to Koros. The accused was cognizant of the circumstances and drove safely to his parent's home in Koros. I must find him innocent.

[8] Section 429 (b) of the Chapter empowers the Chief of the Public Safety to establish speed limits to regulate the speed in the travel of vehicles on the highways and streets. On highways where no speed limits are designated, the maximum speed has been standardized at twenty-five miles per hour (25 MPH). The Court notes judicially that no speed limit signs have been established on the highway, the scene of the criminal charge at issue.

[9-10] There is nothing in the evidence that shows that the accused exceeded the 25 MPH speed limit when he drove his vehicle on the highway in the afternoon of March 17, 1985, as alleged in the complaint. It was between Dien and his home at Koros, after officer Ruben Tom entered the arrest attempt, that evidence tended to imply over-speeding, when the accused was fleeing the pursuing police vehicle which Officer Tom, grand-uncle of the accused, was driving. Notwithstanding, no witnesses testified to the speed the accused traveled, except the accused, when in answer to the prosecution, estimated having traveled at about 30 MPH. To decide from this evidence would be purely conjectural. A man is presumed innocent unless proven guilty, beyond reasonable doubt. There is still reason in my mind to doubt. Justice requires that I must therefore find the accused innocent.

The defendant is charged in Count III of violating Chapter 8, Section 803 (1) of the Pohnpei Vehicle Code, specifically for fleeing from police officers. The prosecution established the corpus delicti, and I am convinced the defendant committed the crime charged. The accused pleads duress or coercion and compulsion in his defense.

[11-14] An act which would otherwise constitute a crime may be excused when committed under duress or compulsion which is present, imminent, and impending and which produces a well grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm, except in the case of homicide. See 22 C.J.S.B. Criminal Law Section 44. This is true since the necessary ingredient of intention is lacking. See Tomoya Kawakita, 72 S.Ct. 950, and rehearing 73 S. Ct. 5; R.I. Recreation Center v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 177F. 2d 603, 12 A.L.R. 2d 230. Though coercion does not excuse taking the life of an innocent person, it does excuse most, if not all, other offenses. The doctrine of coercion or duress cannot be invoked as an excuse by one who had a reasonable opportunity to avoid doing the act without undue exposure to death or serious bodily harm.

[15] In the case at bar, the evidence showed that after the injury of Salvador, State v. Route, supra the accused and his companions packed into their truck and proceeded to Kitti. On the way, between Paies and Officer Tom's residence in Dien, Officer Robi overtook their truck and stopped at Tom's residence to solicit reinforcement. It was there that the accused's truck went by, where he observed that Tom was going to enter the arrest attempt. He knew then that he was in danger of getting beaten by officer Tom,

his grand-uncle. In fear of this, he rushed his truck to his parents' home at Koros, where he felt he would be protected from Tom. At Koros he voluntarily stopped: There is evidence that he was beaten up by his grand-uncle prior to his arrest. I find that the accused willfully failed to bring his vehicle to a stop when instructed to do so by the pursuing police vehicle, but that the accused had no intention to flee or elude the officers. Yes he did not stop instantly, but that was out of his fear of getting beaten up by one of the officers. I consider, under circumstances of this case, that his act is excusable. Therefore, I find the accused innocent.


	POHNPEI SUPREME COURT REPORTS VOL. 1 [1 P. S. Ct. R 221] POHNPEI STATE, Plaintiff v. JOSEPH ROUTE, Defendant Pohnpei Criminal Case No. 172-85 Trial Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court September 5, 1985 Prosecution on three counts for criminal offenses. Count I charged the defendant for violation of the Pohnpei State Vehicle Code, Chapter 8 Section 805, driving while under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. Count II charged him for violating Chapter 4, Section 429 of the Code by exceeding the speed limit of 25 mph on the highway, and Count III charged him for violating Chapter 8 Section 803 (1) of the Code, for fleeing from police officer. The Trial Division of the Pohnpei Supreme Court, JUDAH C. JOHNNY, Associate Justice, held (1) that as there is no definition of the phrase "under the influence of [1 P. S. Ct. R 222] intoxicating liquor" in the statute "if intoxicating liquor has affected the nervous system, brain or muscle of the driver of an automobile as to impair to an appreciable degree, his ability to operate his car in a manner that an ordinary, prudent and cautious man in full possession of his faculties, using reasonable care, would operate or drive a similar vehicle under like conditions, then such driver is "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" within the meaning of the statute; (2) that the guilt of the defendant on the over speeding charge was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, and (3) that though the prosecution established the corpus delicti and the Court was convinced the defendant committed the crime of fleeing from the police officers, the testimony showed that he had no intention to flee but was in fear of imminent bodily harm, and under the circumstances, his act was excusable. 1. Statutes - Construction Where the statute does not define the term "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" it is for the Court to define the phrase, as it may be construed to mean "drunk", "completely out and devoid of reason" or "having taken one drink." 2. Statutes - Construction While the gist of the crime is "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" it appears evidently that it is not the intent of the framers of the law to fasten guilt in the case of any and every "influence", due to the use of intoxicating liquor, however slight. 3. Statutes - Construction Article VIII, Section 805 of S. L.2L-132-82 was enacted to protect the public from those who, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, attempt to operate an automobile upon the highway of this State, especially at a time when there is a world of increasing traffic difficulties. 4. Criminal Law - Statutes - Construction Article VIII, Section 805 of S.L-132-82 should be construed liberally so as to effect its purpose, and bring safety to those who drive on the public highway in an orderly and lawful manner. 5. Statutes - Construction The phrase that follows "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" in Section 8, i.e. " to a degree which renders him incapable of safely [1 P. S. Ct. R 223] driving"should be the measuring instrument in determining the extent or condition of intoxication that constitutes "under influence of intoxicating liquor" under which to operate a motor vehicle would be an offense, since one may be "under influence" but to a degree in which he is still capable of safely driving. 6. Statutes - Construction The purpose of Article VIII, Section 805 of S.L.2L-132-82 is to protect careful and safe drivers too. 7. Statutes - Construction The phrase under the influence of "intoxicating liquor" may be defined by saying that "if intoxicating liquor has far affected the nervous system, brain or muscles of the driver of an automobile as to impair to an appreciable degree, his ability to operate his car in a manner that an ordinary, prudent and cautious man in full possession of his faculties using reasonable care, would operate or drive a similar vehicle under like conditions," then such driver is "under the influence of intoxicating liquor," within the meaning of the statute. 8. Courts - Judicial Notice Where no speed limit signs have been established on the highway, the Court takes judicial notice that the standard speed limit of 25mph is applicable. 9. Criminal Law -Evidence - Degree of Proof Where no witness testified to the speed the accused traveled, except the accused who when in answer to the prosecution estimated having traveled at about 30mph, to decide from this evidence would be purely conjectural. 10. Criminal Law - Evidence - Presumptions A man is presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 11. Criminal Law- Excusable Crimes An act which would otherwise constitute a crime may be excused when committed under duress or compulsion which is present, imminent and impending and which produces a well grounded apprehension of death or [1 P. S. Ct. R 224] serious bodily harm, except in the case of homicide. (22 C. J.S.B, Criminal Law, Section 44) 12. Criminal Law - Crimes - Excusable Crimes A crime that is excusable lades the necessary ingredient of intention. 13. Criminal Law - Crimes - Excusable Crimes Though coercion does not excuse taking the life of an innocent person, it does excuse most, if not all, other offenses. 14. Criminal Law - Crimes - Excusable Crimes The doctrine of coercion or duress cannot be invoked as an excuse by one who had a reasonable opportunity to avoid doing the act without undue exposure to death or serious bodily harm. 15. Criminal Law - Crimes - Excusable Crimes Where person to be arrested knows that he is in danger of getting beaten by a police officer, his grand uncle, and willfully fails to stop his vehicle when instructed to do so by pursuing police vehicle, and rushes his truck to his parent's home where he voluntarily stops for protection from the beating, and had no intention to flee or elude pursuing police officers, the circumstances excuse the crime of fleeing from the police officers. Counsel for Plaintiff: Dickson Santos Counsel for Defendant: Mark Mausert JUDAH C. JOHNNY, Associate Justice, Held before me on September 4, 1985, at Kolonia, Pohnpei State. It was stipulated that this case will be decided on the basis of evidence brought in the trial of Pohnpei Criminal Case No. 273-85, State vs. Route, for the reason that charges made in this case stem from the same incident that gives rise to Criminal Case [1 P. S. Ct. R 225] No. 273-85. The prosecution did not call additional witnesses. The accused testified for himself. I allowed it. Facts The accused and six other companion boys came to Kolonia from Kitti on March 17, 1985, to visit. Before they returned to Kitti, they bought for themselves some alcohol: a bottle of vodka and a bottle of bacardi. On their way to Kitti, they stopped at the school playground in Palikir and began to drink the bottle of vodka. Before they finished the vodka, they went on their way. The accused had some drink of the vodka. At Paies, they got into a fight with a police officer who stopped them to investigate their consumption and possession of alcoholic beverage on their vehicle. The fight ended with the injury of a Solpisio Salvador. The accused has been convicted for the injury of Salvador (Pohnpei Criminal Case No. 273-85.) After the injury of Salvador, the boys boarded their truck and ran to Kitti. On the way, somewhere between Paies and Dien, Officer Robi passed the boys' truck and proceeded to the home of Officer Ruben Tom, which was near the road in Dien. Officer Robi stopped at Ruben Tom's home and sought police assistance to [1 P. S. Ct. R 226] arrest the boys following. The accused was the driver of the boys' truck. When they passed by Ruben Tom's residence, he saw officer Robi's car parked at the residence, and knew that Ruben Tom, a grand-uncle of the accused, a police officer, was going to engage in the arrest, which officer Robi had attempted unsuccessfully at Paies. He assumed correctly, for Officer Tom joined the force and pursued the boys' truck, with Tom in command. The accused did not obey the police officers' instructions to stop his vehicle, but sped on to Koros in Kitti where his parents home was. He stopped there and was subsequently arrested. Opinion The accused faces three criminal charges. I will discuss them in their order of counts in the complaint. Count I charges the defendant of violation of the Pohnpei State Vehicle Code, Chapter 8, Section 805, driving while under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. Specifically the statute reads, "any person who, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, any narcotic drug, or any other drug, to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving, drives any motor vehicle upon any roadway within the State shall be punished..."SL-2L-132-82. [1 P. S. Ct. R 227] [1] SL-2L-132-82 does not define what is meant by the term "under the influence of intoxicating liquor." I feel it is for the Court to give an instruction defining this term, to provide some conception and understanding of what is generally considered by law as being "under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Without it being defined, one may construe it to mean that a party must be "drunk", another that he be "completely out and devoid of reason," another may construe it to mean that if it is proven that he has taken one drink he is"under the influence of intoxicating liquor." For this reason I believe it is best that this Court define the term, so that it is clear what the law of this State considers as one being "under the influence of intoxicating liquor." It is a well known fact that intoxicating liquor has a different effect upon the system of different parties. Some persons may drink a quantity of liquor, and still be in their normal senses, others with a very limited quantity will be completely out. Some people are not so affected by the drinking of beer, others become completely drunk by the drinking of the same. These are fundamental questions to be determined by the trier of facts, under proper evidence, to meet the issues of each case to arrive at a proper verdict. [1 P. S. Ct. R 228] Statutes relating to the act of driving while intoxicated are not uniform in the terms employed in reference to the particular condition of the driver which is required to bring the act within the terms of the statute which proscribes the offense. One form of statute proscribes the offense in terms of driving "while under the influence of intoxicating liquor". Another proscribes it in terms of driving "while in an intoxicated condition", and still another in terms of driving "while intoxicated or in any degree under the influence of intoxicating liquor." It has been generally held that the phrases "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" and "in an intoxicated condition are synonymous. Moral v. Wyoming Highway Department, 203 P2d 954. There is authority, however, that while all persons intoxicated are "under the influence of intoxicating liquor", the reverse is not true. Shorter v. State, 52 ALR 2d 1329. There is a distinction between drunkenness and being under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and it is not necessary to prove drunkenness to secure a conviction under a statute prohibiting the operation of motor vehicles while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, nor is it necessary to prove any specific degree of intoxication. Shorter v. State, supra. With regard to the offense of driving while under the [1 P. S. Ct. R 229] influence of intoxicating liquor, it has been held in several jurisdictions that even the slightest degree of intoxication is sufficient to support a conviction, and that intoxication need not be of such a degree that it interferes with the proper operation of a motor vehicle. See State v. Duguid, 72 P2d 435 and Harrell v. Norfolk, 42 ALR 550. Other courts have held however, that to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor within the meaning of such a statute, an accused must have been rendered incapable of operating a motor vehicle in a manner in which an ordinary prudent and cautious person in full possession of his faculties, using reasonable care, would operate a similar machine under like conditions. See People v. Dingle 205 P 705; Luellen v. State, 81 P2d 323. [2-3] The gist of the crime as enumerated in Article VIII, Section 805 of S.L. 2L-132-82 is, "under the influence of intoxicating liquor." From the reading of this section, it appears evidently, that it is not the intent of the framers of this law, to fasten guilt in the case of any and every "influence", due to the use of intoxicating liquor, however slight. It was enacted to protect the public from those who, while under influence of intoxicating liquor, attempt to operate an automobile upon the highway of this State, especially [1 P. S. Ct. R 230] at a time when there is a world of increasing traffic difficulties. [4-7] The law should be liberally construed so as to effect its purpose, and bring safety to those who drive on the public highway in an orderly and lawful manner. The Court takes cognizance of the fact that there are increasing cases in the State of Pohnpei that arise under this statute, which include the danger from drunken driving, and I have searched the books for what I believe to be a fair definition of the words "under the influence of intoxicating liquor". I conclude that the phrase that follows "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" in Section 8 should be the measuring instrument in determining the extent or condition of intoxication that constitutes "under influence of intoxicating liquor" under which, to operate a motor vehicle would be an offense. This phrase is, "to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving." One may be "under influence" but to a degree in which he is still capable of safely driving. Clearly, that is not what the framers intend to outlaw. The law intends to protect careful and safe drivers, too. The degree must be at an extent where the person is "incapable"of safely driving. I think I will be well within the bounds of accuracy in defining the phrase by saying that, "if intoxicating liquor has far affected the nervous system, brain or muscles of the driver of an automobile as [1 P. S. Ct. R 231] to impair to an appreciable degree, his ability to operate his car in a manner that an ordinary, prudent and cautious man in full possession of his faculties, using reasonable care, would operate or drive a similar vehicle under like conditions," then such driver is "under the influence of intoxicating liquor", within the meaning of -the statute. In the case at bar, I find no evidence which establishes that the accused, as a result of his sharing in the drinking of the intoxicating vodka, was influenced to the degree discussed above, when he drove his company's car from Paies to Koros. The accused was cognizant of the circumstances and drove safely to his parent's home in Koros. I must find him innocent. Count II charges the accused with the violation of the Pohnpei State Vehicle Code, Chapter 4, Section 429. [8] Section 429 (b) of the Chapter empowers the Chief of the Public Safety to establish speed limits to regulate the speed in the travel of vehicles on the highways and streets. On highways where no speed limits are designated, the maximum speed has been standardized at twenty-five miles per hour (25 MPH). The Court notes judicially that no speed limit signs have been established on the highway, the scene of the criminal charge at issue. [1 P. S. Ct. R 232] Therefore the standard speed limit must be 25 MPH. [9-10] There is nothing in the evidence that shows that the accused exceeded the 25 MPH speed limit when he drove his vehicle on the highway in the afternoon of March 17, 1985, as alleged in the complaint. It was between Dien and his home at Koros, after officer Ruben Tom entered the arrest attempt, that evidence tended to imply over-speeding, when the accused was fleeing the pursuing police vehicle which Officer Tom, grand-uncle of the accused, was driving. Notwithstanding, no witnesses testified to the speed the accused traveled, except the accused, when in answer to the prosecution, estimated having traveled at about 30 MPH. To decide from this evidence would be purely conjectural. A man is presumed innocent unless proven guilty, beyond reasonable doubt. There is still reason in my mind to doubt. Justice requires that I must therefore find the accused innocent. The defendant is charged in Count III of violating Chapter 8, Section 803 (1) of the Pohnpei Vehicle Code, specifically for fleeing from police officers. The prosecution established the corpus delicti, and I am convinced the defendant committed the crime charged. The accused pleads duress or coercion and compulsion in his defense. [1 P. S. Ct. R 233] [11-14] An act which would otherwise constitute a crime may be excused when committed under duress or compulsion which is present, imminent, and impending and which produces a well grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm, except in the case of homicide. See 22 C.J.S.B. Criminal Law Section 44. This is true since the necessary ingredient of intention is lacking. See Tomoya Kawakita, 72 S.Ct. 950, and rehearing 73 S. Ct. 5; R.I. Recreation Center v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 177F. 2d 603, 12 A.L.R. 2d 230. Though coercion does not excuse taking the life of an innocent person, it does excuse most, if not all, other offenses. The doctrine of coercion or duress cannot be invoked as an excuse by one who had a reasonable opportunity to avoid doing the act without undue exposure to death or serious bodily harm. [15] In the case at bar, the evidence showed that after the injury of Salvador, State v. Route, supra the accused and his companions packed into their truck and proceeded to Kitti. On the way, between Paies and Officer Tom's residence in Dien, Officer Robi overtook their truck and stopped at Tom's residence to solicit reinforcement. It was there that the accused's truck went by, where he observed that Tom was going to enter the arrest attempt. He knew then that he was in danger of getting beaten by officer Tom, [1 P. S. Ct. R 234] his grand-uncle. In fear of this, he rushed his truck to his parents' home at Koros, where he felt he would be protected from Tom. At Koros he voluntarily stopped: There is evidence that he was beaten up by his grand-uncle prior to his arrest. I find that the accused willfully failed to bring his vehicle to a stop when instructed to do so by the pursuing police vehicle, but that the accused had no intention to flee or elude the officers. Yes he did not stop instantly, but that was out of his fear of getting beaten up by one of the officers. I consider, under circumstances of this case, that his act is excusable. Therefore, I find the accused innocent. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the accused is acquitted on Counts I, II, and III. This matter is dismissed.