FSM SUPREME COURT
APPELLATE DIVISION
Cite as Federated Shipping Co. vs. Ponape Transfer and Storage,
5 FSM Intrm. 89, (App. 1989)
FEDERATED SHIPPING CO., LTD.,
Appellant,
vs.
PONAPE TRANSFER AND STORAGE, and
PONAPE STATE DIVISION OFMANAGEMENT
AND
ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC LANDS,
Appellees.
FSM APP. P10-1989
ORDER
June 28, 1991
Before:
Honorable Richard H. Benson, Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court
*Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena, III, Temporary Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court;
**Honorable Edwel Santos, Temporary Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court
*Chief Justice, Superior Court of Guam, on this court by special designation for this case.
**Chief Justice, Pohnpei State Supreme Court, on this court by special designation for this case.
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HEADNOTES
Appeal and
Certiorari
The date of notice from the clerk that the record is ready, not the filing of the Certification of Record, triggers the running of the due date of an appellant's brief. Federated Shipping v. Ponape Transfer & Storage, 5 FSM Intrm. 89, 91 (App. 1991).
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COURT'S OPINION
RICHARD H. BENSON, Associate Justice:
Appellees seek a dismissal of the appeal pursuant to FSM App. R. 31(c). Appellees contend that appellant Federated Shipping Co., Ltd. has failed to file its brief on appeal in a timely manner and that appellees have incurred
prejudice due to the delay. For the reasons set forth below we deny the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal.
I.
In this motion we examine the provisions of FSM App. R. 31 which provides, in part:
(a) TIME FOR SERVING AND FILING BRIEFS. The appellant shall serve and file his brief within 40 days after the date of notice by the clerk of the Appellate Division pursuant to Rule 12(b) that the record is ready.
Appellees contend that appellant was required to file its brief on appeal within 40 days of the filing of the Certification of Record by the Clerk of Court on April 19, 1990. It is argued that this Certification of Record constituted an official notice to appellant to file its brief, and that appellant's failure to so file warrants a dismissal of the appeal.
We are not persuaded by appellee's argument. The Certification of Record is not the notice to the appellant contemplated by the rule. Appellees ignore the express language of Rule 31(a) as well as FSM App. R. 12(b) which provides, in part:
Upon receipt of the "record ready certificate" from the clerk of the court appealed from . . . the clerk of the Supreme Court Appellate Division shall file it and shall immediately give notice to all parties of the date on which it was filed and the date, 40 days after this notice . . . when appellant's brief will be due.
These rules make it clear that it is the "record ready" notice from the clerk, and not the filing of the Certification of Record which triggers the running of the due date of an appellant's brief.
In this instance the record reflects an uncontroverted statement contained in the October 5, 1990 affidavit of Kohsak Keller, Acting Chief Clerk of Court, that "neither I nor the Chief Clerk has notified the parties to this action that the record is ready." Thus because no "record ready" notification had been sent to the parties, the 40-day filing period had not yet commenced.
II.
For the reasons stated the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
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